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ABSTRACT 
JOSHUA CAMERON EYER. Cognitive control of attention, emotion, and memory: An 
ERP study. (Under the direction of DR. MARK FAUST) 
Unwanted retrieval of negative memories can be problematic for many clinical 
populations.  The Think/No-Think (T/NT) task (Anderson & Green, 2001) is a new 
paradigm for studying cognitive control during cued recall.  In this task participants view 
a cue item and are asked to consciously retrieve (think) or interrupt retrieval (no-think) of 
the associated target item.  Eyer (2009) found that self-reported mindfulness was 
correlated with T/NT cued recall, suggesting a relationship between control of memory 
retrieval and a general cognitive control skill.  The current study measured event-related 
potentials (ERPs; i.e., electrical brain responses time-locked to cue presentation) for 
negative and neutral stimuli on the TNT task to assess cognitive control during retrieval.   
Method: Participants (N = 35) completed questionnaires (e.g., mindfulness, 
intrusive thoughts) and cognitive tasks related to cognitive control (e.g., attention, 
working memory span).  Then, ERPs were recorded during the TNT task, followed by a 
final cued recall test. 
Results: Analyses of ERPs found evidence to support somewhat separable neural 
networks for control of memory retrieval and for processing the emotional content of the 
target pictures, with some time windows only exhibiting a main effect of strategy or of 
emotional valence.  However, there was widespread evidence for interactions of these 
subsystems across a range of time latencies post-cue presentation.  Of particular note was 
a significant Strategy x Valence interaction for the early P1 component (125-164 ms).  
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The overall size of the N2 (250–324 ms) peak was correlated with a wide range of self-
report and cognitive test measures of cognitive control at frontal electrode sites.   
Discussion: The present study adds to knowledge of the timing of control 
processes during performance of the TNT task through its use of ERP methodology.  The 
effect of the emotional valence of the to-be-recalled target on the early P1 ERP 
component suggests surprisingly early emotional processing during memory retrieval.  
The present results also suggest that at least some of the control processes used during the 
TNT task are part of a larger general-purpose cognitive control system.  These results 
suggest that individual traits provide important and varying influences on the cognitive 
control of emotional memories.     
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW 
From disturbing images to moments of embarrassment to upsetting dreams, we 
are all troubled by negative memories that we would rather not recall.  Important 
individual differences determine how negative thoughts and memories affect us.  Clinical 
scientists have been studying the role of negative thoughts and memories in 
psychological disorders for decades (Beck, 1967; Harrington & Blankenship, 2002; 
Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004) as cognitive scientists have studied memory processes to 
understand better how memory works.  Recently, these two areas of research have found 
increasing common ground.  For example, a concerted effort into the study of the role of 
inhibitory control over memory retrieval (Anderson & Green, 2001; Depue, Banich, & 
Curran, 2006) has led to calls for more collaboration across traditional interdisciplinary 
lines (Levy & Anderson, 2008).  Such research has opened new lines of inquiry into the 
relationship between cognitive memory processes and psychological disorders, 
particularly by allowing the investigation of how processes involved in the cognitive 
control of memory adjust to mood states and the perception of emotional stimuli (Depue 
et al., 2006; Hertel & Gerstle, 2003; Hertel & Mahan, 2008). 
Increasingly, cognitive and neuroscience research supports a unified cognitive 
control system.  The concept of cognitive control (i.e., sometimes called executive 
function) is used to represent an imputed, unitary neural system that functions to regulate 
a wide range of other neural processes.  For example, there is strong evidence to suggest 
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that the brain areas used for cognitive control of memory are the same for cognitive 
control of behavioral responses (Levy & Anderson, 2002).  These findings are consistent 
with a functional view of memory proposed by Cowan (1999), who suggested that 
control of memory uses cognitive control of attentional processes to identify relevant 
material in memory and then shift or maintain focus of that material.  Recently, new 
research has proposed that the neural areas responsible for emotion regulation exert early 
influence on neural areas involved in cognitive control processes (Banich et al., 2009).  
Although evidence exists to indicate likely brain areas involved in cognitive control and 
control of emotion, less evidence exists to elucidate the exact timing and emergence of 
these networks and their effects, respectively.   
Furthermore, it follows that if there is a shared system for cognitive control, then 
we should see correlations between cognitive control and a range of related constructs.  
Using recall scores and a self-report measure of mindfulness, a previous study (Eyer, 
2009) found a relationship between the ability to maintain mental focus and the operation 
of cognitive control in memory.  Following in this vein, the current study used an 
innovative new cognitive task, the Think/No-Think (T/NT) task, that allows assessment 
of cognitive control mechanisms responsible for retrieving and preventing retrieval of 
recent memories.  Furthermore, the study used a multimodal assessment paradigm by 
assessing the influence of mood and emotional content of memory items on ERP 
measures of the cognitive control of memory.  Specifically, event-related potentials 
(ERPs; averaged electrical responses of the brain in response to a stimulus event) were 
recorded during the T/NT task to measure cognitive control processes directly as they 
occur.  Second, cognitive tasks assessing performance on measures of attention and 
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working memory were included to improve understanding of the relationship between 
attentional focus and cognitive control of memory.  Third, self-report measures were 
administered to investigate the role of dispositional mindfulness (i.e., the expression of 
mental focus in day-to-day life), intrusive thoughts, rumination, mood, and perceived 
stress.  Using this paradigm, the current study investigated individual differences in 
cognitive control and replicated and extended previous research on the T/NT task  by a 
number of researchers (Bergstrom, de Fockert, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2009; Depue et 
al., 2006; Eyer, 2009; Hertel & Mahan, 2008; Nair, 2008) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Negative Thoughts and Control Strategies 
We are all plagued by negative thoughts and memories that we would rather not 
think about, yet despite the fact that we all suffer from such thoughts, large individual 
differences exist in how those thoughts affect us.  Although many people think good 
memory is the ability to recall information as desired, fewer recognize that an important 
part of this process is the ability to inhibit irrelevant memories that are unnecessary or 
undesired.  With the purpose of understanding these processes better, clinical scientists 
have been studying the function of negative thoughts and memories in psychological 
disorders for decades (Beck, 1967; Harrington & Blankenship, 2002; Papageorgiou & 
Wells, 2004), while cognitive psychologists have been studying memory to learn more 
about the processes whereby we remember or forget (e.g., Cowan, 1999).  One notable 
area of research into the difficulty of dealing with negative thoughts comes from the 
clinical evidence describing reoccurring negative cognitions and methods of coping with 
them. 
Negative Intrusive Thoughts 
Cognitive intrusions, more commonly known as intrusive thoughts, are a 
widespread and difficult symptom of a number of mood and anxiety disorders, from 
PTSD to major depression to obsessive-compulsive disorder (Carlier, Voerman, & 
Gersons, 2000; Clark & Rhyno, 2005; Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Reynolds & Brewin, 1998; 
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Watkins Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005).  Although seen reliably in clinical populations, 
they are also found in nonclinical populations.  In one study of 125 university students, 
researchers reported that 99% reported experiencing intrusive negative thoughts 
(Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau, & Gagnon, 1991).  Clark and Rhyno offered a general 
definition of intrusions as ―any distinct, identifiable cognitive event that is unwanted, 
unintended, and recurrent.  It interrupts the flow of thought, interferes in task 
performance, is associated with negative affect, and is difficult to control‖ (p.  4). Thus, 
whether arising spontaneously or from obvious triggers, cognitive intrusions are recurring 
undesirable thoughts that are resistant to attempts to stop thinking about them.  Many 
negative thoughts and memories, therefore, qualify as intrusive thoughts that require 
effortful cognitive control to inhibit them. 
Intrusive thoughts can vary greatly between individuals; however, there seem to 
be common underlying processes in the way people cope with them.  As might be 
expected, the content of intrusive thoughts varies a great deal person-to-person and may 
center on almost anything from the thought of a person, place, or thing to a fear or a 
negative statement (Clark & Purdon, 1995; Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau, & Gagnon, 
1992).  Generally, clinical and experimental researchers do not make clear distinctions 
between intrusive thoughts and memories, although a few differences have been 
discussed (Brewin, Christodoulides, & Hutchinson, 1996).  Related to this, Freeston et al. 
(1991) developed a clinical assessment of individualized cognitive intrusions that records 
an individual’s personalized experience of intrusive thoughts and is also sensitive to 
preferences in cognitive coping strategies.  Their measure has been well received by other 
clinical researchers for its comprehensiveness and innovation (Clark & Purdon, 1995).  
However, the wealth of clinical research into assessing intrusive negative thoughts 
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suggests that the content of negative cognitive intrusions is helpful but not sufficient in 
identifying clinically significant intrusions.  Instead, it appears that there are underlying 
patterns to failures in cognitive control of negative thoughts that are able to be identified 
as clinically important, such as rumination.  The nature of such responses may help 
indicate the cognitive mechanism at work. 
Responses to Persistent Negative Intrusive Thoughts 
Common responses   
Although they have been linked to a number of disorders from posttraumatic 
stress and obsessive-compulsive disorders to depression and anxiety (Reynolds & 
Brewin, 1998; Watkins et al., 2005), the presence of intrusive thoughts alone, given their 
prevalence, is not sufficient to explain the development of such disorders.  In fact, when 
given enough time, cognitive resources, and opportunity, individuals are usually able to 
suppress negative thoughts or memories (Freeston et al., 1991; Levy & Anderson, 2008; 
Reynolds & Brewin, 1998; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987).  Consequently, it 
is likely that a person’s responses to negative thoughts or memories matter more than 
whether the thoughts occur.  Supporting this conclusion, Williams and Moulds (2007) 
found that, although intrusive negative memories were common in a college student 
sample, the concurrence of negative appraisals and attempts at cognitive control of the 
memories were more linked with depressive symptoms.  This suggests that the 
occurrence of intrusive thoughts becomes problematic because of responses to the 
thoughts more than because of the thoughts themselves.  Salkovskis, Westbrook, Davis, 
Jeavons, and Gledhill (1997) formed a similar conclusion, advancing a set of 
characteristics to explain how failed suppression can develop into disorder.  They 
suggested that dysfunction related to otherwise-normal intrusive thoughts occurs when 
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they (a) are perceived as personally relevant to the individual, who then takes 
responsibility for their content and/or occurrence and wishes to take action to prevent 
them, and (b) result in attempts to neutralize the thought to reduce this perceived 
responsibility.  Consequently, when a person identifies the intrusions as meaningful and 
attempts to control them, they can trigger dysfunctional patterns of coping, and in fact, a 
new wave of therapies has shown success at treating a range of disorders by focusing first 
on reducing the negative appraisals related to the thoughts (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 
2003).  Thus, responses to negative intrusive thoughts and memories are likely to lead to 
problems when a person identifies them as personally troubling and then attempts to 
control them.  Subsequent failures at control appear to be especially problematic in these 
people. 
Control strategies 
When negative cognitive intrusions do occur, a range of compensatory responses 
are used to address them (Freeston et al., 1991; Levy & Anderson, 2008; Reynolds & 
Brewin, 1998).  In fact, a common and distinctive trait in the expression of recurring 
unwanted intrusive thoughts is that people tend to develop particular control strategies to 
cope with them and the distress they can produce (Clark & Rhyno, 2005).  Freeston et al. 
(1991) studied a nonclinical sample and found that there were three groups of strategies 
that people used regularly: effortful escape/avoidance (40%); effortful attentive thinking 
(34%); and no effortful response (26%).  Thus, about a third of individuals sampled from 
a nonclinical population experiencing intrusive thoughts preferred to try to use inhibitory 
cognitive control to ignore or suppress them, while a slightly larger group attempted to 
apply selective attention by bringing some other thought to mind that pushed the 
unwanted thought from awareness.  The remaining minority reported passively waiting, 
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presumably until the intrusive thought was displaced by a resumption of the typical 
stream of consciousness.  Consistent with these findings, an overview of the literature on 
the cognitive control of memory, Ochsner and Gross (2005) identified two methods of 
reducing memories: controlling attention for emotionally evocative stimuli and using 
cognitive methods to change the meaning of such stimuli.  That is, they suggest one must 
either use cognitive control to change the target of attentional processes (distraction) or 
use effortful cognitive processes to alter the appraisals related to the target (reappraisal). 
These categories are also present in a more refined conceptualization of executive 
thought control.  Well and Davies (1994) identified five primary strategies of thought 
control: reappraisal, attempts at challenging, analyzing, or reinterpreting the thought; 
distraction, attempts to supplant the intrusive thought with other thoughts or by doing 
something else; punishment, attempts to punish oneself cognitive or physically for having 
the thought; social control, attempts to discuss or refrain from discussing the thought with 
others; and worry, attempts to shift focus to other more or less negative concerns.  
Furthermore, a recent study has confirmed the assertion of Wells and Davies that three 
strategies, worry, punishment, and distraction, would be related to more negative 
outcomes than reappraisal and social control (McKay & Greisberg, 2002).   
Thus, according to Salkovskis et al. (1997) and Wells and Davies (1994), control 
strategies seem to fall into general groupings in which executive cognitive control is used 
to actively avoid (i.e., distraction, worry, and social control if refraining) or attentively 
process (i.e., reappraisal, punishment, and social control if discussing) negative thoughts 
and memories.  Furthermore, it appears that attempts at avoidance are more likely to lead 
to negative outcomes than attempts at direct processing.  Although its relative 
effectiveness is hard to assess, using no effortful strategy is not technically a control 
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strategy, in the same way that doing nothing to move out of the way of a speeding car is 
not actually a strategy to avoid it.  However, Williams and Moulds (2007) suggest that if 
those choosing this option are not particularly troubled by the negative thought and are 
unconcerned whether it is maintained in awareness or not, perhaps because they have 
already successfully used reappraisal to diminish the importance of the thought, then it 
may be that it passes without negative repercussions for the person.  Ultimately, it seems 
that adaptive strategies of thought control involving active, intentional processes are more 
likely to lead to positive coping with intrusive thoughts while avoidant strategies seem 
more likely to result in a loss of control. 
Failures in cognitive control 
Such failures in the use of control strategies for intrusive negative thoughts (e.g., 
avoidance, suppression, distraction, neutralization, etc.), whether by a breakdown in 
one’s capacity to use them or by selection of an ineffective strategy, often lead to 
characteristic patterns of dysfunction.  Attempts at cognitive control of negative thoughts 
have been repeatedly implicated in the development and maintenance of several modes of 
a cognitive process widely known as rumination (but also called repetitive thought; 
Langlois, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 2000; Wenzlaff, 2005; Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003; see 
Martin & Tesser, 1996, and Watkins, 2008, for reviews).  That is, when a negative 
thought occurs, attempts to control it out of awareness may lead to increased and repeated 
experiences of the thought.  Martin and Tesser have suggested that ruminative thoughts 
are a common response to a number of situations that involve a discrepancy between 
reality and a desired goal or outcome, where different contexts result in different content 
(1996).  Several studies report that repetitive thoughts are a shared component in both 
worry and depressive rumination (Langlois et al.; Harrington & Blankenship, 2002; 
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Watkins et al., 2005), leading some to observe that intrusive memories tend to be 
associated with sadness while intrusive thoughts tend to be associated with fear or 
anxiety, usually about the future (Brewin et al., 1996).  These studies describe worry as a 
cognitive compulsion to think about a fear as a way to address the message of danger the 
intrusion carries (e.g., ―If I think about it enough, I’ll figure out a way to avoid it‖; Hardy 
& Brewin, 2005; Watkins et al., 2005).  Negative rumination is described as a cognitive 
compulsion to process negative self-referential intrusive thoughts (e.g., ―What have I 
done to deserve being alone?‖; Miranda & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007; Treynor, Gonzalez, 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003; Peterson & Seligman, 1984).  A number of studies have found 
that increases in intrusive thinking and rumination are related to increases in negative 
mood (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994; See Wenzlaff, 2005, for a review).  These findings 
have led to studies of repetitive or ruminative thinking as a common shared mechanism 
that displays different content in different contexts (Langlois et al., 1991; Segerstrom, 
Stanton, Alden, & Shortridge, 2003).  Taken together, these investigations suggest a 
proposed mechanism where attempts at coping with intrusive thoughts lead to 
rumination, paradoxically increasing the frequency of the thoughts and leading to mood 
disorder.   
Summary 
From this review of the literature on negative thoughts and control strategies, 
several ideas emerge with practical implications for studies of memory and emotion.  
First, while the occurrence of negative thoughts is nearly universal, some people have 
more trouble than others pushing them out of awareness.  However, as shown above in 
Freeston et al. (1991), the content of negative thoughts only becomes problematic when 
the cognitive control mechanisms used to minimize them break down.  Second, difficulty 
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with negative thoughts appears to arise when a person identifies a negative thought or 
memory as personally troubling and attempts to use a control strategy to push it out of 
awareness; however, failures of this control attempt appear to be especially problematic.  
Third, control strategies for negative thoughts seem to fall into general groupings of 
active avoidance (i.e., distraction, worry, and social control if refraining) or attentive 
processing (i.e., reappraisal, punishment, and social control if discussing), for which 
attempts at avoidance appear less effective than direct processing.  The third possibility, 
not to respond to the thought, may also be adaptive in some situations.  Fourth, these 
investigations suggest a proposed mechanism where attempts at coping with negative 
thoughts can lead to rumination and an increase in the frequency of the thoughts.  
However, this seems to occur only when the control strategies fail.  Consequently, the 
sum of this clinical research suggests that meaningful breakdowns in the cognitive 
control of negative thoughts occur when a person identifies the thought as meaningful 
and attempts to push it out of awareness but fails.  Consequently, cognitive strategies for 
reducing the occurrence of negative thoughts and memories are likely to be either 
distract/avoid strategies, as with thought replacement/substitution, or active inhibitory 
processes.  The differences between substituting and inhibiting strategies are likely to 
also produce differences in brain processes (as supported by Bergstrom et al., 2009), and 
failures in these strategies are likely to lead to dysfunction at managing negative thoughts 
and perhaps even psychological disorder.  In particular, rumination appears to be related 
to thought control through these processes, and in fact, a previous study by Nair (2008) 
found a relationship between rumination and thought control using neurophysiological 
recordings.  Together, these studies produce important implications to research 
attempting to investigate thought control of negatively valenced cognitive events. 
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 Cognitive Control of Memory: Relevant Theories 
Several theories have been proposed by clinical and experimental researchers to 
help explain the breakdown in cognitive control that occurs when negative intrusive 
thoughts are not effectively managed.  Below three theories will be reviewed for their 
inputs to a possible mechanism for how intrusive thoughts could lead to disordered 
thinking. 
Ironic Process Theory 
Wegner et al. (1987) proposed a cognitive mechanism to explain how active 
attempts to exclude a thought from consciousness can produce an increase in that target 
thought.  First demonstrated in the White Bear studies, nonclinical participants were 
encouraged to avoid thinking about a white bear, but experienced a large number of 
intrusions of this thought (Wegner et al., 1987).  To explain this, Wegner et al. proposed 
ironic process theory, which suggests that cognitive control of negative thoughts, 
particularly when attempting thought suppression, involves a two-component process: 
one effortful, control mechanism that requires sufficient cognitive resources to produce 
the desired outcome, and another automatic, resource-light mechanism that signals the 
presence of the undesired outcome, such as negative intrusive thoughts requiring 
suppression (Wegner, 1994; Wegner et al., 1987; see Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000, for a 
review).  Essentially, it suggests that during periods of cognitive load, attempts to exclude 
a thought from awareness are accompanied by increases in the experience of the 
cognition, due to the greater relative activity of the automatic checking process for the 
undesired target thought over the controlled inhibitory process (Wegner, 1994).   
Similarly, in a review of cognitive control processes across three lines of task 
performance research, Gopher (1996) concluded that effective performance was a 
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combination of automatic processing and successful use of cognitive control (top-down) 
processes.  From this model, then, cognitive control for negative thoughts may function 
through an automatic identifying mechanism that signals the brain when an undesired 
thought occurs.  Immediately, a second, effortful process begins to act to consciously 
push the undesired thought out of awareness.  A behavioral analogue may be seen in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder.  Salkovskis et al. (1997) indicated that the repetitive 
behavioral coping responses of reassurance-seeking and compulsions (such as hand-
washing) are actually failed attempts at neutralization of intrusive thoughts.  That is, 
when a person experiences an unwanted obsession, the person practices a behavioral 
compulsion that reduces the anxiety related to the negative thought.   
Importantly, ironic process theory also indicates that when a person is under 
stress, the identifying automatic mechanism continues functioning (bringing attention to 
the unwanted thoughts) but the control mechanism is unable to suppress or reduce it, 
resulting in more prominent cognitive intrusions (Wegner et al., 1987; Wenzlaff & 
Wegner, 2000).  There are a number of reasons why this control mechanism might 
function poorly.  The processes responsible for inhibitory control over negative cognitive 
intrusions seem to require some minimum level of cognitive resources for effective 
operation (Levy & Anderson, 2008).  When intrusive thoughts occur and such resources 
are not available—such as at times of stress—the suppression is unable to proceed as 
needed and the negative thoughts are seen to increase in frequency (Wegner, 1994; 
Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003; See Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000, for review).  One study sought 
to confirm the influence of high stress in depleting necessary cognitive resources.  After 
assessing a group on their suppression ability and waiting 10 weeks, those who had 
scored as high suppressors and who had experienced high levels of stress also reported 
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much higher levels of negative rumination and depressive symptoms, which were 
significantly greater than before or than those scoring as low suppressors (Wenzlaff & 
Luxton, 2003). 
Executive Deficit Hypothesis 
Although cognitive resources are necessary for the effective suppression of a 
negative memory, there are also individual differences in each person’s ability to control 
intrusive memories.  That is, some are very good at cognitive control of intruding 
memories whereas others are not.  As a result, when unwanted intrusive thoughts occur in 
the absence of cognitive resources needed to inhibit them, successful suppression is 
unable to proceed.  Levy & Anderson (2008) proposed the executive deficit hypothesis to 
explain these individual differences in the ability to use effortful control of memory 
retrieval and forgetting.  Furthermore, these variations in control also correspond to 
Wegner’s proposed second component.  As might be expected, difficulty predictably 
managing cognitive events due to failures in cognitive control have been linked to a 
number of dysfunctions and disorders.  
Performance Characteristics of Cognitive Control 
A third theory describes how variations in the effortful executive process may 
function.  Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister (1998) offered a compelling model for failures 
in self-regulation that suggests that cognitive control may become fatigued over time or 
from intense periods of inhibition.  Described using the metaphor of a muscle, it explains 
both how individual differences arise (due to different ―strengths‖ of cognitive control) 
and how gradual reductions in control occur (as fatigue sets in).  However, it also implies 
that training can ―strengthen‖ cognitive control, increasing its capacity for dealing with 
decreases in cognitive resources.  That is, when undergoing a period of strain such as 
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being required to maintain focus during a long lecture, effective self-regulation is seen to 
gradually decrease as evidenced by increasing loss of focus.  Similarly, a moment of very 
high self-regulation, such as an exam, can lead to rapid fatigue of self-regulation 
processes.  Notably, repeated exposure to experiences like these allows us to gradually 
improve our ability to deal with them.  That is, executive self-regulatory control appears 
to develop with exposure to experiences that test it. 
Towards a Unitary Theory of Cognitive Control 
An integration of these models describes an executive cognitive control 
mechanism with several characteristics.  The proposed mechanism should act as the 
effortful component process to an automatic process that draws attention to an undesired 
outcome (e.g., to behave successfully in church, one must recognize not to fidget, not to 
speak, not to sleep, etc.); should function better in some individuals than others; should 
decrease in effectiveness with prolonged or intense use; and should demonstrate 
vulnerability to environmental influences that deplete its resources and decrease its 
function. 
Recently, several models of cognitive control have been proposed, especially in 
the cognitive psychology literature, and increasingly, these models have demonstrated 
similar mechanisms of function across domains.  Notably, these models have been 
supported by areas of shared brain activation across cognitive control tasks in multiple 
domains (see Anderson & Green, 2001, and Naghavi & Nyberg, 2004, for examples), and 
researchers are now beginning to implicate these consistencies into more unified models 
of cognitive control (see the Urgency-Gating model by Cisek, Puskas, & El-Murr, 2009 
for an excellent example of a model linking action planning with decision making).  One 
such model has been proposed by Posner and colleagues to describe networks associated 
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with the sources of attention, as opposed to areas where attention is exerted (Fan, 
McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002; Posner & Peterson, 1990).  Essentially, they 
propose that there are three attention networks with three functions: one for alerting, one 
for orienting, and one for executive control.  The alerting network produces and 
maintains an alert state.  The orienting network directs attention to the sensory process 
desired.  The executive control network resolves cognitive conflict where discrepancies 
exist that must be resolved before proceeding, e.g., when an expected result does not 
occur.  Each of these networks has been isolated in function, neuroanatomy, and 
neurophysiology.  Fan et al. (2002) report that the alerting network is associated with 
norepinephrinergic activity in the right hemispheric frontal and parietal areas.  They 
report that the orienting network is associated with activity in the superior parietal and 
frontal lobes, and disengaging from one stimulus is hindered by lesions in the 
temporoparietal junction.  Finally, the network for cognitive control of attention activates 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC).  To help explore 
these networks, the researchers have created an attention task that allows assessment of 
performance characteristics in each of these domains.  It is noteworthy that this 
description of the attention network fits well with the ironic process theory mentioned 
earlier.  That is, both have effortful, cognitive control processes tasked with deciding 
between alternative strategies, and the alerting network for attention seems to overlap 
well with the automatic signaling process hypothesized by Wegner and colleagues.  Such 
similarity offers promise for arriving at a broadly explanatory model for cognitive 
control. 
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Summary 
From these studies, there appears to be growing evidence for a common 
mechanism of exerting cognitive control across different domains.  The work of Posner 
and colleagues provides interesting new avenues of study for the relationship between 
cognitive control in other domains, such as emotion or memory, and the cognitive control 
of attention.  For example, the control of memory appears to include an automatic 
signaling process and a cognitive control process, whereas the ANT networks propose 
that there are two automatic processes, one for directing awareness and the other for 
signaling its importance, and an executive controller.  Further research should explore the 
similarities between two networks.  If the attention and memory control networks have 
common or shared components, then the mechanism combining them could have 
significant implications for the cognitive control of emotional memories, providing 
rationales and models for why some control efforts fail and some succeed.  More research 
is needed in this area to confirm the networks underlying cognitive control in different 
domains.  Fortunately, work by Anderson and colleagues and Depue and colleagues have 
created a new method of investigating these processes, utilizing the T/NT task to explore 
memory function and its interrelations to emotional material. 
Mindfulness, Attention, and Related Constructs 
Given the model for dealing with negative thoughts described above, cognitive 
control of memory appears to involve several interrelated cognitive constructs, including 
dispositional mindfulness (or mental focus), attention, and mood.  In a previous study by 
the author (Eyer, 2009; see ―The Pilot Study,‖ p.  45), self-reported dispositional 
mindfulness was found to identify a significant difference in the use of cognitive control 
of memory between participants.  This novel finding provides notable implications for 
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the relationship of mindfulness to attention and cognitive control given that each of these 
constructs requires a sufficient level of effortful mental focus to be used successfully.  As 
a result, mindfulness, attention, and mood should provide a prime area of investigation 
for identifying the cognitive influences on memory control.  We will look at each in more 
detail below. 
Mindfulness 
Definition and description 
Mindfulness grows out of traditional religious (Buddhist, Yogic, etc.) teachings 
and is described by Kabat-Zinn as a process of bringing effortful attention to one’s 
moment-by-moment experience (1990).  Mindfulness is one of a number of mind-body 
interventions that include meditation, yoga, and exercise shown to have beneficial 
cognitive and biological effects (see Kabat-Zinn, 2003 for a review).  These therapies 
have been linked to reliable effects on mental processes, and interventions based on these 
techniques have been employed to build participants’ ability at cognitive control (Hayes 
et al., 1999; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Linehan, 1995; Lutz et al., 2009).  Essentially, 
mindfulness interventions instruct a person to sit comfortably in an upright position and 
attempt to maintain attention on a specific focus, usually somatic sensations such as 
breathing for concentrative meditation or virtually any identifiable stimulus for 
mindfulness meditation (Bishop et al., 2004; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Valentine & Sweet, 
1999).  Whenever focus is lost, the person is encouraged to take notice of the thought that 
intruded and then return attention to the breathing, allowing the thought to drift back out 
of awareness without judging or elaborating on its meaning (Bishop et al., 2004; Kabat-
Zinn, 1990).  This skill improves with practice, and one goal of treatment is for the use of 
mindfulness to be integrated into everyday life, allowing one to intentionally exert 
19 
control when cognitively tested by maintaining mental focus.  Bishop et al. (2004) 
describe a state of mindfulness as ―a kind of non-elaborative, non-judgmental, present-
centered awareness in which each thought, feeling or sensation that arises in the 
attentional field is acknowledged and accepted as it is‖ (p.  8).  Most measures of 
mindfulness, such as the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2008), are 
self-report and designed to assess how well one is able to develop different facets of this 
skill.   
By contrast, other measures have focused on pre-existing individual differences in 
day-to-day mental focus, a construct called dispositional mindfulness.  Examples of such 
measures include the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003).  Such 
measures attempt to identify individual differences in people’s skill at using cognitive 
control in their everyday lives.  In a previous study by the author (Eyer, 2009; see ―The 
Pilot Study,‖ p.  45), self-reported mindfulness as assessed by the Mindful Attention 
Awareness Scale was found to identify those who were not able to use cognitive control 
on memory of negative stimuli.  Thus, dispositional mindfulness appears to harness a 
construct closely related to a trait-like characteristic of someone’s ability to manage their 
attentional focus in their everyday lives.  Although this definition is quite different than 
the one given above, a recent effort has been made to reconcile the mindfulness literature 
and produce a guiding operational definition. 
In this pursuit, Bishop et al. (2004) have proposed that mindfulness is best 
described as an evoked state that manages attention towards an internal focus and is 
therefore a skill that can be learned.  Consequently, they define it as having two 
components: the first is an intentional self-regulation of attention maintained on 
immediate experience, and the second is a particular orientation focused on one’s 
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experiences in the moment and characterized by curiosity, openness, and acceptance.  
Mindfulness practice and lead to deeper insight into the nature of one’s thoughts by 
accentuating their subjectivity and transience versus a perception of them as being true or 
permanent.  Although this definition clearly distinguishes the state-like, dual-focused 
mindfulness here from dispositional mindfulness, it does imply a more precise definition 
for it.  A measure of day-to-day mindfulness fits most closely with a more persistent 
ability to maintain an intentional self-regulation of attention.  Measurement, then, of such 
a construct should have significant implications for one’s ability to direct and maintain 
attention in other situations as well.  Logically, if mindfulness is a skill that can be taught 
with measurable attentional benefits from prolonged training and mastery (Bishop et al., 
2004), such training should produce quantifiable effects on measures of attention and task 
performance. 
Empirical support 
As expected, the literature on mindfulness training shows a clear benefit to 
attentional processes.  In a study comparing mindfulness meditators to a control group 
(Valentine & Sweet, 1999), those who practiced mindfulness regularly showed superior 
performance over a nonmindful control group on a test of sustained attention.  
Furthermore, Valentine and Sweet found some differences in the effects of meditation 
based on the type of meditation practiced.  They reported that long-term meditators 
outperformed newer meditators, and mindful meditators showed a slight advantage in 
reacting to unanticipated stimuli when compared to concentrative meditators, a group that 
attempt to focus on a single thought, idea, or sensation.  In another study, even a brief 
meditation training resulted in significant improvements in participants’ abilities to focus 
attention and self-regulate (Tang et al., 2007). 
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In a study employing the Attention Network Test (ANT; Fan et al., 2002), Jha, 
Krompinger, & Baime (2007) studied the influence of two types of mindfulness training 
on ANT attention performance in comparison with a control group of nonmeditators.  
One group of naïve (new) meditators showed improvements in attentional orienting after 
attending an 8-week training in Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR; Kabat-
Zinn, 1990), and another group of experienced meditators trained in MBSR showed 
improvements in their attentional alerting after attending a month-long, intensive 
mindfulness retreat.  Both of these findings were significant when compared to the other 
meditation group and the no-training control group.  Although the experienced group 
outperformed both comparison groups on the ANT’s measure of executive 
control/conflict monitoring at the start of the study, the groups did not differ on 
attentional executive control after the training.   
Another study by Lutz et al. (2009) showed a significant improvement in 
sustained attention following three months of training in meditation.  Data collected on 
behavioral responses and EEG recordings over anterior brain areas showed that improved 
behavioral responses were related to increased brain-pattern consistency on 
electroencephalographic recordings, suggesting more efficient cognitive function.  The 
authors concluded that mindfulness resulted in an enhancement of neurophysiological 
responses to sensory inputs, improving the participants’ ability to control their attention.  
Consequently, mindfulness appears to affect attention in positive ways and may even 
serve as an indirect measure of attention control.  However, other assessments offer more 
direct measures of individual differences in cognitive control of attention. 
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Attention 
Attention Network Test 
Although there are a number of measures of attention, no other researchers have 
produced the compelling body of evidence for a coherent system of attention than Fan, 
Posner, and colleagues (Fan et al., 2002; e.g., Posner & Petersen, 1990).  They have 
reported neurobiological and developmental support for three interrelated but separate 
attention networks with the functions of alerting, orienting, and executive control.  After 
extensive research, they have produced a task capable of measuring performance in each 
of these three networks called the Attention Network Test (ANT; Fan et al., 2002).  No 
other existing measure of attention is as comprehensive or as minimally time-intensive 
for the participant while still producing quantitative results on all three subsystems of 
attention.   
Attention and memory 
Other research into attention suggests that it plays a key role in memory.  Cowen 
(1999) proposed the Embedded-Processes Model as a functional explanation how the 
construct of working memory may be attentional processes acting on long-term memory, 
through both an effortful executive process and an automatic orienting process.  
Essentially, this model suggests that people use cognitive control of attention to interact 
with long-term memory stores to hold information in an easily accessible state for the 
purpose of completing a mental task, whether related to language, problem solving, or 
decision making.  Based on this model, working memory span should be related to 
general executive control in other areas where attention may be an important influence on 
cognition.  Exploring that idea, a study by Brewin and Beaton (2002) found that higher 
working memory capacity was linked to higher fluid intelligence (but not crystallized 
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intelligence) and better cognitive control of negative intrusive thoughts, with sizeable 
implications for cognitive disorders.  In a study of the relationship between attention and 
memory, Redick and Engle (2006) also identified support for such a link.  Comparing 
extreme groups on a span test of working memory capacity, the researchers found 
significant differences between groups on the ANT’s measure of executive control, but 
not its measures of orienting and alerting.  The authors suggested that this supports the 
idea of individual differences in executive control of attention playing a role in memory 
performance.   
Cognitive control of emotional memory 
Despite the growing research into cognitive control of memory, less research has 
investigated the cognitive control of emotion-related processes.  In one study, Depue et 
al. (2006) found that participants were able to utilize control processes related to 
emotionally valenced stimuli to remember or forget stimuli as instructed.  In a follow-up 
study using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in a memory task, Depue, 
Curran, & Banich (2007) identified neuroanatomical evidence that failed suppression 
relied on a network that governs sensory representations to erode recall for items.  As 
retrieval was successfully prevented, a second network became active that overlapped 
areas commonly associated with cognitive control, including the prefrontal cortex and the 
hippocampus.  Notable, the network also included inputs from the amygdala, presumed to 
carry the emotional information for integration with other memory attributes. The authors 
interpreted this to mean that cognitive control of emotional stimuli involves the expected 
cognitive control systems, but also special emotion inputs that exert influence on the 
others.  In an extensive review of this literature, Banich et al. (2008) used these results 
24 
and others to call for more research into the effect of cognitive control of emotion for 
working memory and long-term memory. 
Summary 
To understand better the nature of the relationship between mindfulness, attention, 
and cognitive control of memory, a good measure of attention is necessary.  Impairments 
in memory performance may be due to lapses in attention that prevent successful learning 
and action (Carriere, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008).  Fortunately, Fan and colleagues have 
created a computer-administered task that accurately assesses participant performance on 
three separate networks of a hypothesized model for attention function (2002).  As 
described above, this test has been used previously in research on attention and mental 
focus, contributing valuable information on working memory, mindfulness training, and 
level of attentional function.  Consequently, especially when considering emotionally 
valenced stimuli that may be reactive to decreases in cognitive resources (Hertel & 
Mahan, 2008), research into the cognitive control of memory would do well to consider 
including measures of mindfulness, attention, and/or working memory to assess the 
influences of individual differences in attention.  However, it is also clear that accurate 
assessment of emotional content in memory requires the assessment of depression-related 
variables, such as depressive symptoms and rumination.   
Depression, Rumination, Intrusive Thoughts, and Stress 
Clinical and Psychometric Variables Related to Control of Memory 
As discussed below, mood-related variables often play a significant if indirect or 
even hidden role in studies of memory.  Notable among these effects has been the finding 
that one’s level of depressive symptoms may be a predictor of one’s memory 
performance for emotionally valenced stimuli.  The phenomenon called mood-congruent 
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memory bias provides an explanation for how these variables affect memory.  Similarly, 
the common cognitive mechanism termed rumination, often identified as a response to 
negative intrusive thoughts, is a characteristic trait of many presentations of depression 
and carries implications of its own for research.  Furthermore, if it does underlie 
depressive rumination, a fuller understanding of a person’s difficulty managing negative 
intrusive thoughts should be accessible through measures of intrusive thinking and 
perceived stress.  Consequently, these variables will be examined more closely below. 
Depressive Symptoms and Memory Bias 
One of the most variable findings in the research on memory is the effect of 
different levels of depressive symptoms (see Blaney, 1986, & Barry, Naus, & Rehm, 
2004).  Termed the mood-congruent memory bias (MCMB), most individuals show some 
level of this phenomenon that appears to function differently with different expressions 
and intensity of mood (Matt, Vázquez, & Campbell, 1992).  Essentially, it indicates that 
positive stimuli are remembered more easily when one’s mood is positive, and negative 
content is remembered more easily when one’s mood is negative or depressed (Matt et 
al., 1992).  In a meta-analysis, Matt et al. (1992) reported that normal, nondepressed 
people remembered on average 8% more positive than negative stimuli.  In contrast, 
those with subclinical depression remembered equal numbers of positive and negative 
stimuli, and clinically depressed people remembered 10% more negative stimuli than 
positive.  A number of studies have also reported increased preference among those high 
in depression for negative autobiographical memories (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1998; Teasdale, 1983; 1988; See Blaney, 1986, for a review) and for task-
irrelevant but mood-congruent information (Frings, Wentura, & Holtz, 2007; Power, 
Dalgleish, Claudio, Tata, & Kentish, 2000).  This individual variability in memory 
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performance has proven so difficult to study that it has left some researchers 
conspicuously baffled: ―The effect seems a will-o’-the-wisp that appears or not in 
different experiments in capricious ways that I do not understand‖ (Bower, 1987, p.  
451).   
However, some researchers have begun to identify consistencies in these 
variations.  For example, Hertel and colleagues have suggested that MCMB varies by 
whether passive or active memory processes are employed.  They suggest that the mood-
congruent preference for negative stimuli of those high in depressive symptoms occurs 
through a passive process in which fewer negative stimuli than positive are forgotten 
(Hertel & Gerstle, 2003; Hertel & Mahan, 2008; Joorman, Hertel, Brozovich, & Gotlib, 
2005).  By contrast, more active forgetting paradigms show no mood-congruent 
preference for negative stimuli and, in some cases, better controlled forgetting of negative 
memories (Hertel & Mahan, 2008; Joorman et al., 2005).  This is quite different than the 
commonly found result that those with depression appear to show a deficit related to the 
inhibition of negative emotional material (Joorman, 2004) and to have a characteristically 
different pattern of performance than those with some level of dysphoria or with none 
(Matt et al., 1992).  From these studies, there appears to be a clear, reliable relationship 
between one’s level of depressive symptoms and one’s memory function such that high 
levels of depression lead to greater memory for negative stimuli and low levels of 
depression lead to greater memory for positive stimuli.  However, this may be mostly an 
effect found in passive recall and forgetting.  Further research is needed to identify the 
exact pattern.   
As a result, while this research is inconsistent, it is expected that those with few 
symptoms of depression should show very different memory recall patterns than those 
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with some or many symptoms.  Active memory paradigms may show less of an effect 
than passive memory tasks, perhaps because they control better for participant effort.  
Given the decrease in cognitive resources seen in depression, it may be that more 
symptoms result in reliable patterns of reduced participant performance.  This uncertainty 
notwithstanding, these studies emphasize the importance of adequately assessing 
depressive symptoms when studying memory of emotional stimuli. 
Depression and Rumination 
Because of their interrelation, it is difficult to distinguish the relative influences of 
depression and rumination.  Over 40 years of research have provided a compelling 
association between rumination and major depression (Beck, 1967; Harrington & 
Blankenship, 2002; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004).  Rumination has been described in a 
number of ways (see Martin & Tesser, 1996, and Watkins, 2008, for reviews of different 
modes of ruminative thought).  Some researchers have created extensive typologies 
describing different types of ruminations (Martin & Tesser, 1989) while others have 
focused on ruminations resulting from specific circumstances or events (Tait & Silver, 
1989).  Since 1991, many studies have used the definition proposed by Nolen-Hoeksema 
describing depressive rumination as ―repetitively focusing on the fact that one is 
depressed; on one's symptoms of depression; and on the causes, meanings, and 
consequences of depressive symptoms‖ (p.  569). Within this construct, two types of 
rumination have been distinguished, with one more maladaptive than the other (Treynor 
et al., 2003).  Negative rumination, termed brooding, has been defined as the repeated 
cognitive processing of the consequences of a negative stimulus, whereas a less negative 
rumination, termed reflection, was defined as the repeated cognitive attempt to identify 
the causes for a negative event (Treynor et al., 2003).  Several studies have since 
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confirmed the two-factor model of rumination by Treynor et al. (2003) and that reflection 
appears to have less negative effects than brooding (Joorman, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006; 
Lopez, Driscoll, & Kistner, 2009).  New research using this definition is providing even 
stronger connections between depression and rumination (Rude, Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, 
& Whitney, 2002; Treynor et al., 2003; See Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000, and Nolen-
Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008, for reviews), and there is growing evidence 
that the negative, perseverative style found in depressive rumination may be a 
characteristic in some people that is resistant to change and related to prolonged 
difficulties with depression (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000).   
Rumination and Memory 
Based on these measures, research has found direct connections between negative 
rumination and memory.  In one study, depressive rumination was linked to 
neurophysiological measures of memory suppression (Nair, 2008).  In that study, Nair 
found that brooding, and not reflection, was positively related to brain activity correlated 
with better control of memory processes (Nair, 2008).  However, behavioral measures 
based on stimulus recall at the end of the study did not show a matching behavioral effect 
for brooding.  Other studies also show inconsistent relationships between rumination and 
memory control.  In a 1998 study of dysphoric people allowed or induced to ruminate 
while performing a memory task, Hertel found significant impairment in memory 
performance for both groups compared to a control, and in another study, she found 
evidence for a rumination-related difficulty in forgetting negative stimuli (Hertel & 
Gerstle, 2003).  However, in a follow-up study similar to Nair (2008), these deficits 
ceased to be significant with further participant training in successful, active forgetting 
(Joorman et al., 2005).   
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When taken together, these studies suggest that depressive rumination is related to 
cognitive control of memory dysfunction, but the exact relationship is not clear.  Similar 
to the research on mood-congruent bias, it appears to vary in different situations.  This is 
not surprising if rumination underlies or shares the cognitive mechanism producing the 
mood-congruent bias.  It is interesting to note that Nair (2008) apparently found no 
support for rumination influencing cognitive control behaviorally but did find significant 
relationships emerge with brain activity.  Notably, more research must be done in this 
area to clarify these findings, particularly combining neurophysiological and behavioral 
measures. 
Intrusive Thoughts 
As described above, negative intrusive thoughts are a commonly experienced 
phenomenon with significant implications for clinical disorders, cognitive processes, and 
memory.  In particular, a strong line of research has characterized depressive rumination 
as a cognitive response to the experience of unwanted, self-referential, negative intrusive 
thoughts (Miranda & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007; Peterson & Seligman, 1984; Treynor et al., 
2003; Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003; Wenzlaff, 2005).  In some cases, they have been 
theorized as the cognitive events that trigger depressive rumination followed by clinical 
symptoms (Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003) and have been shown to cause disruptive 
intrusions during memory tasks of emotional stimuli (Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2009).  
For these reasons and the theoretical value presented in the possibility of linking intrusive 
thoughts to depressive rumination and cognitive control of memory, a study of the effect 
of emotion on memory should consider assessing a person’s methods of and success at 
coping with cognitive intrusions. 
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Stress 
Finally, given the requirements for cognitive resources needed in the models 
described above, stress may be an important source of influence on cognitive control of 
successive suppression attempts (Levy & Anderson, 2008).  Previously, high current 
stress levels have been found to lead to decreases in cognitive functioning that had 
significant effects on memory and processing (Cohen & Williamson, 1988).  As a result, 
Hertel and Mahan and others (2008; Joorman et al., 2005) have suggested that, due to the 
higher demands of managing mood-related cognitive processes, investigations of 
cognitive control of memory should also include an assessment of stress. 
Summary 
That there are cognitive deficits in depression is widely known, and these deficits 
serve as important clinical indictors (APA, 2000; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).  There is 
increasing evidence for a cognitive mechanism underlying these deficits (see Wenzlaff & 
Wegner, 2000).  Research into these deficits has suggested that they may arise as part of 
negative cognitive cycle that feeds back on itself.  Essentially, it appears that we all 
experience intrusive thoughts, but some can address them better than others, using more 
adaptive methods.  When there is a stress applied to the system that robs it of resources 
needed to push negative thoughts from awareness, a negative ruminative process begins 
to occur that increases the occurrence of negative intrusive thoughts and, 
correspondingly, the cognitive resources needed to control them, intensifying the deficit.  
Eventually, the continuation of this process may lead to a depressive disorder.  However, 
the exact effect of such a mechanism on memory control is still uncertain. 
It can be hypothesized that higher levels of cognitive symptoms of depression 
(e.g., diminished ability to think, concentrate, or make decisions) should produce quite 
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different patterns of memory control than lower levels, especially showing more mood-
congruent bias during passive forgetting procedures.  For active memory control 
paradigms, it may be that low levels of depression indicate someone who has practice 
dealing with negative intrusive thoughts but who also is relatively high in cognitive 
resources, leading to rapid, effective reduction in negative thoughts.  However, higher 
levels of depression may lead to insufficient cognitive resources to complete the task, 
producing patterns that suggest low effort.  Future research will need to determine if this 
model of depressive symptoms and memory performs in this manner. 
Researching the Cognitive Control of Memory 
The T/NT Task and Memory Suppression.   
The recent creation of the T/NT task has allowed researchers to quantify a 
participant’s ability to use cognitive control during retrieval from long-term memory.  
This task has opened new lines of research into the relationship between cognitive 
memory processes and psychological disorders (Depue et al., 2006; Hertel & Gerstle, 
2003; Hertel & Mahan, 2008), particularly how mood and the emotionality of 
information to be stored or retrieved results in recruitment of neural regions associated 
with the cognitive control of emotion processing.  To date, there has been insufficient 
research exploring the relationships between cognitive control processes in different 
domains.  However, there is evidence to suggest some shared processing.  For example, 
cognitive control of memory appears to activate the same network of brain areas as 
cognitive control of behavioral responses (Levy & Anderson, 2002).  Because it requires 
active halting of stimulus-initiated memory retrieval, the T/NT task provides for direct 
measurement of brain processes associated with memory control, and for measurement of 
the influence of memory control on memory performance. 
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The T/NT Task 
One of the primary reasons for the recent increase in knowledge about the 
relationship between memory and cognitive processes is the creation of the T/NT task.  A 
cognitive extension of the behavioral go/no-go paradigm in which participants are cued 
by an attribute of the stimulus either to perform or inhibit a learned behavioral response, 
Anderson and Green (2001) developed the T/NT to provide a behavioral measure of a 
person’s ability to stop a thought even after it has already been triggered.  The procedure 
for the T/NT task employs 3 phases, an initial learning phase in which paired cue-target 
items are memorized, a middle inhibition/facilitation phase in which participants 
repeatedly view cue items that signal them to recall some of the previously learned 
pairings (think condition) and prevent the recall of others (no-think condition), and a final 
recall phase to record which items were remembered and which were forgotten 
(Anderson & Green, 2001).  Through this design, the T/NT task can assess a participant’s 
ability to use cognitive control to halt automatic, cue-driven retrieval from memory of a 
previously learned target stimulus, a phenomenon called response override (Levy & 
Anderson, 2008).  Using a portion of the stimuli held aside as a baseline, recall of 
pairings from the think and the no-think condition can be related to an individual’s 
uninfluenced memory performance.  The amount an individual is able to recall think 
items above baseline or decrease recall for no-think items below baseline identify the 
effect of the differences in strategy on memory and give a measure of his or her ability to 
exert cognitive control on remembered stimuli.  Notably, these stimuli may be any 
effective cue-target match and have already been validated with words and images 
(Depue et al., 2006).  Since its creation, this paradigm has been used in a number of 
studies into the cognitive control of memory. 
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Individual Differences in Cognitive Control 
The T/NT task has proven to be flexible and effective at investigating variations 
between people in the cognitive control of memory.  In a meta-analysis of all their 
studies, Levy and Anderson (2008) found large individual differences in people’s ability 
to utilize cognitive control to exclude thoughts from conscious awareness.  As might be 
expected, the range in performance is striking.  Although the general effect is a modest 
6% below-baseline reduction in memory for stimuli presented during the no-think portion 
of the task, participants show up to 60% below-baseline recall, suggesting excellent 
cognitive control, while others have shown up to 40% higher above-baseline recall of no-
think stimuli.  Thus, some participants are able to avoid thinking about the no-think trials 
successfully, forgetting more than half of the number of pairings remembered in the 
baseline condition, whereas some show such poor cognitive control that, even though 
they are asked not to think about them, they actually remember no-think items 40% better 
than items in the baseline condition.  This variability provides strong support for Levy 
and Anderson’s (2008) proposed executive deficit hypothesis (p.  14), which describes 
how control of memory could be better in some than others. 
Cognitive Control of Emotionally Valenced Stimuli 
In a study of the effects of valence and arousal on the cognitive control of 
memory, Marx, Marshall, and Castro (2008) reported a number of findings.  Employing 
the T/NT task on positive and negative word stimuli, they found more effective use of 
cognitive control of memory for positive stimuli than for negative and as stimuli became 
more arousing (independent of emotionality).  This effect was mostly driven by much 
better cognitive control for memory of positive stimuli, for both cued recall scores 
(overall mean approximately 80%) and free recall scores (overall mean approximately 
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50%).  The authors explained this by suggesting that negative but not positive 
information is elaborated in memory and, as a result, is suppressed with more difficulty, 
consistent with reports that negative emotional states lead to more effortful processing 
than positive states.  However, this study neglected to assess the depressive symptoms or 
mood of its participants, tempering the generalizability of these findings. 
Another study investigated the valence effects of negative and neutral stimuli on 
cognitive control of memory recall.  Using face-word and face-picture pairs, Depue et al. 
(2006) varied the emotional valence of the target items as either negative or neutral.  
They found that neutral items were remembered at a higher level overall and that 
negative items were both more largely facilitated and inhibited by cognitive control 
processes than neutral items for both verbal and nonverbal stimuli.  That is, participants 
were better able both to remember and forget negative items when compared to neutral.  
This study provided additional evidence for the increased importance of cognitive control 
mechanisms when processing emotional information but, as with the previous study, 
failed to account for memory affects related to active depressive symptomatology. 
Depressive Symptoms 
Despite its creation as an experimental cognitive task, the T/NT paradigm has 
seen increasing use in clinical studies.  In one, it was used to explore differences in 
participant performance related to the presence of depressive symptoms.  Joorman et al. 
(2005) used the T/NT task with word stimuli to investigate stimulus valence in those with 
depression.  They found that nondepressed participants recalled negative and positive 
stimuli equally well, but among depressed participants recall for negative items was 
higher than for positive items.  Also, while passive memory for unpracticed items 
indicated evidence for a mood-congruent facilitation effect (depressed participants 
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recalled more unpracticed negative items than positive items; see p.  25), depressed 
participants showed better cognitive control of memory for negative items than 
nondepressed participants.  In fact, after removing those who acknowledged performing 
the task poorly, the researchers were able to replicate below-baseline recall for the 
negative content condition.  Together, these results suggest that those with higher levels 
of depressive symptoms seem to demonstrate passive biases towards remembering 
negative stimuli, but when using more active control processes, show better performance 
on memory measures than less depressed individuals. 
Rumination 
Building on research by Hertel, Joorman, and colleagues and Depue et al. (2006), 
a recent study (Nair, 2008) used the T/NT task to compare performance on a measure of 
rumination with memory performance on picture stimuli.  As in Depue et al. (2006), 
participants were asked to memorize matched pairs of photos of faces and images of 
pictures.  Half the picture images were negative and half were neutral, providing the 
opportunity to assess a person’s relative success at controlling memory of emotionally 
valenced stimuli.  However, the current study also included electroencephalographic 
recordings time-locked to the presentation of stimuli (ERPs) to investigate behavioral 
scores on the T/NT task in more depth.  Overall, the results indicated that neutral items 
were remembered more than negative items, but negative items were not more largely 
facilitated and inhibited by cognitive control of memory.  However, higher endorsement 
of rumination was related to greater neurological activity linked to attempts at cognitive 
control of memory.  In other words, higher ruminators showed greater differences in 
brain activity at parietal sites for think versus no-think conditions.  This activity was not 
linked with behavioral results supporting effective control of memory.  Consequently, 
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while the results do not have clear implications, the study indicates a need for future ERP 
studies of cognitive control of memory using stimuli of varying emotionality. 
Event-Related Potentials 
ERPs are used to identifying sequential brain activity related to participant 
performance on a behavioral task.  A useful and extensive description of ERPs is given 
by Luck (2005) and used in this section as a source unless otherwise indicated.  ERPs are 
derived from continuous EEG recordings of electrical brain activity 
(electroencephalograms or EEGs) recorded through a noninvasive, low-risk procedure in 
which electrodes are placed on the scalp to collect patterns of electrical activity in cortical 
neurons.  Electrode-gel provides an electrical connection between the electrodes with the 
skin.  These connections with the scalp allow the transference of brain signals to the 
recording system.  The main value of ERP recording is that its temporal resolution is 
accurate down to thousandths of a second.  Because of this ERPs offer significant 
improvements over other neuroimaging methods like positron-emission topography or 
magnetic resonance, which have temporal resolutions of only several seconds.  As a 
result, ERPs are the primary method of identifying the timing and sequencing of 
cognitive activity related to participant responses to a stimulus or on a task.   
ERP data is presented as a waveform (see Figures 1, 2, & 3) that charts the 
activity at each electrode by amplitude and latency.  The amplitude is the height of the 
waveform in microvolts (μV) at any point in time.  Latency refers to the amount of time 
elapsed since the stimulus was presented (zero on the x-axis).  As the waveform advances 
in time, its amplitude swings from baseline (zero on the y-axis) to positive and negative 
amplitudes.  Each maximal point (―peak‖) and minimum (―trough‖ or ―negative peak‖) 
represents important changes in neural activity in the cortex, labeled components.  
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Notably, because it measures concerted neuronal activity, the higher or lower the 
amplitude, the more powerful the effect is presumed to be.  ERP components follow a 
simple taxonomy based on polarity and latency.  If the polarity of the amplitude is 
negative, the component is labeled first with an N, and if it is positive, it is labeled with a 
P.  The second part of the label gives the average latency or sequence for that component 
to arrive at its positive or negative peak.  Thus, a P300 represents an ERP component that 
is positive going and that peaks on or around 300 ms after stimulus presentation, or 
alternatively, a P3 component is the third positive-going peak in a waveform.  These two 
taxonomies rarely diverge.  Some prefer the use of sequential labels (N2) because the 
common latency labels sometimes do not represent observed latencies (i.e., a P300 may 
peak 250 ms after stimulus onset).  
To process ERPs, recorded EEGs of brain activity are sectioned and then 
averaged by trial condition within individuals, aligning each section at the exact moment 
the stimulus was presented.  If the number of trials is sufficient, the averaging process 
removes random noise and leaves only systematic patterns of brain activity related to the 
condition being studied.  Individual averaged ERP waveforms are then averaged across 
individuals (a nonweighted average) to create a grandaverage waveform representing the 
average performance of all participants at each condition and removing variation related 
to noise and individual differences.  (From this point, ―waveform‖ or ―ERP‖ will refer to 
the grandaverage.)     
Previous research 
ERP research into the T/NT task offers promising results for a greater 
understanding of cognitive control of emotion and memory.  In one study by Bergstrom, 
Velmans, de Fockert, and Richardson-Klavehn (2007), ERPs were used to identify 
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variations in performance of the T/NT task using word stimuli.  The researchers reported 
a component occurring between 200 and 300 milliseconds that distinguished think trials 
from no-think trials by latency and amplitude.  This component did not vary whether the 
appropriate paired image had been learned or not.  Bergstrom et al. also found a 
component between 500 and 800 milliseconds that occurred only for remembered think 
pairs.  The authors indicated that this late parietal positivity (LPP) component was 
indicative of successful conscious recall.  In a follow-up study, Bergstrom et al. (2009) 
found ERP evidence supporting the use of two strategies during no-think trials: direct 
memory suppression and self-distracting thought substitution.  As might be expected, 
these two strategies produced different ERP waveforms.  Direct suppression reduced 
parietal positivity between 300 and 600 milliseconds that they associated with successful 
memory recall.  Direct suppression, but not distraction, also resulted in inhibitory 
forgetting that was signaled by an early negativity that they felt might be consistent with 
a negativity also seen in behavioral motor inhibition (error-related negativity, ERN).  In 
contrast, the distraction memory strategy produced forgetting that did not result from 
inhibitory processes and, importantly, that had no effect on the late parietal positivity 
associated with successful recall.  Bergstrom et al. interpreted this to mean that there are 
two types of forgetting, one that uses inhibitory processes and one that does not, 
suggesting that forgetting can occur through direct control or through substitution, i.e., 
forming competing, alternative memories.  
Similarly, Nair (2008) used ERPs and the T/NT task to investigate the influence 
of emotion on mental processes.  Using emotional pictures from a study by Depue et al. 
(2006), the results of testing for 23 participants supported the presence of a very early 
effect (~150 ms) for emotional processing of visible stimuli at parietal sites.  Other 
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effects emerged around the P3 component, where Nair found effects for strategy and 
valence strongest at the right parietal electrode.  In the later component, a significant 
Strategy x Valence interaction emerged, indicating that the effect of strategy was stronger 
for negative items.  These findings supported the contention by Depue et al. (2007) for 
two memory control networks focused on forgetting: an initial network focused on 
altering sensory representations to reduce retrieval and a longer memory control process 
with inputs to the hippocampus and from the amygdala.  Activity was generally strongest 
at right-parietal electrodes.  The ERP components identified by Nair also mirrored 
closely the two primary findings of Bergstrom et al. (2009) for an early suppression-
related component and a later, posterior, enduring, lateralized component. 
Underlying neural areas 
Neuroimaging research into the T/NT task has provided some evidence for the 
neural networks implicated in task performance.  An fMRI study by Anderson et al. 
(2004) reported a neurobiological model to describe the underlying physiology producing 
active forgetting on the T/NT using word stimuli.  The primary location was found to be 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which acted on the hippocampus to reduce recall in the 
no-think condition. Activity at both areas predicted the magnitude of forgetting.  Other 
areas involved included the anterior cingulated cortex, which was described as a 
signaling area to indicate the need for control, and premotor areas implicated in 
behavioral inhibition, including the dorsal premotor cortex, pre-supplementary motor 
area, and the intreparietal sulcus.  Anderson et al. were careful to note that forgetting 
reflected inhibition of the correct response, not simply extinction of the pairing. 
Another fMRI study completed by Depue et al. (2007) was conducted on negative 
photo images used in the T/NT task.  In a previous study, Depue et al. (2006) found that 
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negative pictures produced a significantly greater strategy effect than neutral pictures. 
Brain areas related to cognitive control of memory (i.e., those found to be more active 
during attempts to prevent a remembered item from coming to mind than during 
successful recall) activated right-sided frontal areas.  Specifically, activity at two 
networks appeared to be orchestrated by Brodmann’s area 10 in the prefrontal cortex. 
Activity during early control trials occurring at the right inferior frontal gyrus appeared to 
represent a ―late correction‖ network that led to decreased activation in the visual cortex 
(fusiform gyrus) and the pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus, two areas involved in the 
sensory representations of memory. A later network, also related to activity at 
Brodmann’s area 10, activated the right medial frontal gyrus and resulted in forgetting-
related decreases in activity at hippocampal and amygdalar areas.  Activity at the right 
medial frontal gyrus, but not at the earlier network, was related to participant 
performance at forgetting.  Thus, the authors suggest that activity by the early network 
may serve to decrease prepotent sensory activity and possibly regulate working memory 
activity through thalamic connections, whereas activity at the later network appears 
directly related to successful inhibitory control over memory retrieval, replicating the 
findings of Anderson et al. (2004) for a prefrontal cortex/hippocampus connection 
responsible for memory control.  Furthermore, the authors propose that their largely 
right-lateralized prefrontal activity is congruent with other research linking right-sided 
activity with emotion regulation. 
Summary 
While limited in their breadth, these studies supply a good beginning for 
continued clinical research into cognitive control of memory using the T/NT task and 
emotionally valenced stimuli.  As demonstrated above, the experimental manipulation of 
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the task is an intervention that allows strong statements to be made about the role of 
cognitive control processes in memory.  Furthermore, experimental manipulations of the 
emotion valence of stimuli allow newly precise insights into the cognitive processing of 
emotional content.  Emerging patterns show that neutral items tend to be remembered at 
higher levels than negative items, but this finding may provide some helpful stability to a 
remarkably inconsistent literature, as other studies have found no valence differences 
(Bradley, Greenwald, & Lang, 1992) or a stronger negative (Joorman et al., 2005) and 
sometimes positive memory bias (see Matt et al., 1992 for a meta-analysis).  One reason 
for this variability is that studies of memory and mood must account for the level of 
clinically significant depressive symptomology that carries with it a well known negative 
bias (see ―Depressive Symptoms and Memory Bias,‖ p.  25). Similarly, the importance of 
the relative arousal of the stimuli is another facet of stimulus valence that is beginning to 
be recognized and addressed.  Of particular note, ERP research has begun to produce 
findings with significant implications for the understanding of cognitive control of 
memory processes.  Specifically, Bergstrom et al. (2009) found neurophysiological 
evidence supporting inhibitory processes as a successful method of negative memory 
control.  Both fMRI studies demonstrated activation in similar areas.  However, Depue et 
al. (2007) found amygdalar activity for negative stimuli that was related to hippocampal 
activity and behavioral recall and that was not present in non-valenced stimuli used in 
Anderson et al. (2004).  Nair (2008) found brain activation with significant valence and 
strategy effects that occurred at right-sided posterior sites during time windows at 150 
and 350 ms that appear to represent the onset and results of conscious cognitive control 
processes.  
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Given these findings, the use of ERPs affords opportunities to develop a better 
understanding of the timing of underlying neurophysiological processes, to identify time 
periods of importance in the use of cognitive control, and to provide a purer measure of 
strategy effects that can be used to identify relationships with other constructs related to 
cognitive control, such as mindfulness or rumination.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: SUMMARY AND PILOT STUDY 
Summary of the Literature Review 
Negative intrusive thoughts are a widespread and common phenomenon, but in 
some people, present significant problems.  Although many are able to manage them with 
seemingly little effort, others have considerable difficulty and may even develop related 
psychological disorders.  Given how widespread they are, it is like that problems arise not 
from the thoughts themselves but rather from failures in attempts to control them.  These 
failures appear to be particularly troublesome when a person identifies the thoughts as 
personally troubling and acts on a desire to control them.  Strategies employed to reduce 
such thoughts generally include avoiding them (e.g., distraction), attentively processing 
them (e.g., reappraisal), or simply waiting for them to go away.  However, failures in 
one’s control strategies can increase the frequency of such negative thoughts and can lead 
to cognitive processes such as depressive rumination, anxious rumination, or obsessions 
that have been linked with a number of common psychological disorders.  It has been 
hypothesized that this occurs at least in part due to the activity of a two-component 
cognitive process, featuring an early, automatic control mechanism and an effortful, later 
control mechanism.   
The physiology underlying cognitive control networks used to reduce negative 
thoughts appears to share many brain areas found in other applications of cognitive 
control, such as inhibition of motor movements.  Two groups of researchers, Depue et al. 
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(2007) and Anderson et al. (2004), proposed similar brain areas for the cognitive control 
of emotional memories that may involve an initial network responsible for reducing 
sensory representations of the memory and a second network that leads to more stable 
forgetting as indexed by reduced activity in the hippocampus.  Depue et al. (2007) also 
reported concurrent decrease in activity at the amygdala for negative stimuli.   
As these studies indicate, the creation of the T/NT task by Anderson and Green 
(2001) has provided a new method of investigating the processes related to cognitive 
control of memory due to its novel task requiring two different cognitive responses to 
memory cues.  The use of emotional stimuli with the T/NT task further increases the 
possibilities for elucidating control processes involved in emotional memory.  Notably, 
the T/NT task also allows simultaneous recording of neurological activity that can 
provide additional information about the cognitive processes underlying observed 
memory results.   
Such impairments in memory performance may be related to a number of 
variables with hypothesized links to cognitive control, and research into cognitive control 
calls for a multifaceted assessment for the identification of individual differences.  Aside 
from recall scores generated on the memory test, ERP brain recordings offer significant 
opportunities for elaborating the link between brain activity and other variables.  The 
allocation of attention seems to be an important element of cognitive control of memory, 
and work by Posner and colleagues suggests that there are three attention-related 
processes, one for directing attention, one for signaling importance, and one for resolving 
attentional conflicts.  As suggested by Cowan (1999) and others, memory itself may 
function by the allocation of attentional focus to long-term memory traces.  
Consequently, actual performance tests of attention and working memory span can 
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provide reliable measures of cognitive activity.  Finally, a few psychometric constructs 
appear to be important to understanding the inconsistencies in cognitive control of 
memory.  In particular, self-report measures assessing mindfulness, failures at cognitive 
control (i.e., depressive rumination, suppression of intrusive thoughts), and clinically 
relevant measures (such as depressive symptoms and perceived stress) could identify 
those who have difficulty handling negative memories.  Together, these measures may 
illuminate patterns of individual differences in the efficiency and function of cognitive 
control.  To establish this possibility, a pilot study was conducted to explore the relation 
between mindfulness and cognitive control of memory. 
The Pilot Study  
An initial study investigating the effects of emotional stimuli on memory control 
was completed in 2009 (Eyer).  It included self-report measures of depressive symptoms, 
rumination, intrusive thoughts, dispositional mindfulness, and perceived stress.  It did not 
include a direct assessment of attention.  The primary measure was behavioral 
performance on the cognitive T/NT task, which included a memory task involving both 
negative and neutral stimuli.  The pattern of resulting recall scores indicated that 
participants remembered 63.1% (SD = 15.5%) of stimuli.  Stimuli held aside after the 
final training session and only seen again during the final recall task were used to identify 
the baseline memory performance.  The overall rate was 53.5%.  Main effects on 
baseline-corrected recall scores were identified for strategy, think (M = 19, 15.80) > no-
think (M = 5, SD = 15.20), F(1,24)  = 29.07, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .55, and for valence, neutral 
stimuli (M = 15.25, SD = 15.97) > negative stimuli (M = 8.75, SD = 13.44), F(1,24) = 
13.53, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .36.  A significant interaction was obtained,  F(1,24) =  20.02, p < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .46, indicating that the effect of strategy was stronger for neutral items than 
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negative items.  Analyses by condition indicated that the two think conditions (negative 
and neutral), but not the no-think conditions, were significantly different than zero 
(representing performance at baseline), suggesting the presence of a memory facilitation 
effect but no evidence of memory suppression. 
The key finding implicated the role of self-reported mindfulness in the 
modulation of attentional control.  Scores on the MAAS, a self-report measure of 
dispositional mindfulness, were significantly correlated with total recall scores (r = .56, p 
= .004).  An extreme-groups analysis, using a median split (median = 4.13) to separate 
participants into low controllers (n = 10, M = 3.45, SD = 0.48) and high controllers (n = 
9, M = 4.70, SD = 0.39), explored the effect of mindfulness on recall and found that low 
versus high controllers produced characteristically different patterns of memory recall 
when attempting to exert cognitive control over stimuli with negative content.  
Specifically, those reporting low day-to-day mindfulness yielded reduced cognitive 
control effects for negative versus emotionally neutral items, whereas high controllers 
yielded statistically equivalent cognitive control effects for both item types.  This finding 
was indicated as control-related phenomenon suggesting that mindfulness may represent 
a behavioral expression of automatic cognitive control processes.  
The Current Study 
Based on the results of the pilot study and the literature presented, the current 
study sought to investigate performance on the T/NT task in relation to measures of 
attention, mindfulness, rumination, depression, intrusive thoughts, and stress.  Several 
key changes from the pilot study were implemented.  The most important was the 
addition of electrophysiological recordings during the experimental phase of the T/NT 
task.  A second change added two comprehensive, rich tests of attention and working 
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memory span performance to supply new information on three networks believed to form 
the attention system.  These measures provided useful information for identification of 
the role of attention and working memory in cognitive control of memory.  A third 
change increased the rigor of the initial training phase of the T/NT task.  After three 
training cycles, a recognition test given during the fourth cycle of training was increased 
in difficulty to strengthen learned pairs and improve assessment of training.  The fourth 
change sought to include an additional measure of mindfulness.  The Five Factor 
Mindfulness Questionnaire assesses mindfulness on five domains. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESES 
The current study is an extension of research into cognitive control of memory 
processes.  Specifically, it used the T/NT task created by Anderson and Green (2001) to 
investigate individual differences in cognitive control of memory.  Furthermore, the study 
built off the work of Depue et al. (2006) who used negative and neutral face-image pairs 
as stimuli in the T/NT task.  Bergstrom et al. (2007) used word stimuli in an ERP study of 
the T/NT task, and Nair (2008) followed up with a study integrating these methodologies 
to investigate the influence of emotionally valenced stimuli on ERP results recorded 
during the T/NT task.  To prepare for the study, a pilot study (Eyer, 2009) was conducted 
that investigated behavioral results on the T/NT task with negative and neutral stimuli in 
relation to a number of theoretically associated psychometric variables, including 
measures of mindfulness, attention, and rumination.  The current study sought extends 
the literature by investigating the following hypotheses.   
Hypothesis 1: Primary Analysis 
Analyses employed a 2 Strategy (think or no-think) x 2 Valence (negative or 
neutral) repeated-measures ANOVA design using baseline-corrected recall scores to 
investigate the effect of stimulus emotionality on the use of cognitive control strategies 
with memory.  In three previous studies of emotional stimuli in the T/NT task (Depue et 
al., 2006; Nair, 2008; and Eyer, 2009), three different overall patterns of recall were 
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identified.  Consistent with the pilot study described above, the following predictions 
were made.   
Main Effect for Strategy 
As found in Anderson and Green (2001), Bergstrom et al. (2007; 2009), Depue et 
al. (2006; 2007), Nair (2008), and the pilot study, recall was anticipated to be higher in 
think trials than no-think trials. 
Main Effect for Valence 
Consistent with Depue et al. (2006) and Nair (2008), recall was anticipated to be 
higher in the neutral condition than the negative condition.   
Interaction Effect 
Consistent with the pilot study, an interaction was anticipated in which the effect 
of cognitive control (think > no-think) was larger for neutral stimuli than negative 
stimuli.  However, other studies have found different patterns (Depue et al., 2006; Nair, 
2008).   
Hypothesis 2: ERP Results 
Using data generated from ERP recordings during the experimental portion of the 
T/NT task, a separate 2 Strategy x 2 Valence repeated-measures MANOVA performed 
on four electrode sites for each time window of interest are expected to produce the 
following effects. 
200-300 ms Strategy Difference 
Consistent with the results of Bergstrom et al. (2007; 2009) and Nair (2008), an 
early main effect for strategy was anticipated between 200 and 500 milliseconds.  Nair 
(2008) found early differences based on stimulus emotion, suggesting automatic emotion 
regulation processes.  Furthermore, according to Bergstrom et al. (2009), the difference in 
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ERP amplitude at later lateral, parietal electrode sites occurring represents cognitive 
control processes related to initiating inhibitory processes for the no-think condition.   
300-600 ms Memory Difference 
Also consistent with Bergstrom et al. (2009), accurate think trials were expected 
to produce a later ERP component that represented cognitive activity associated with the 
successful recall of remembered items.  Consequently, it was not anticipated on no-think 
trials.  Nair (2008) also found later separation related to the emotionality of the stimuli, 
supporting the results of Depue et al. (2007) who proposed emotion-related neural inputs 
to the cognitive control areas. 
Exploratory Effects 
 ERP results were included in correlational analyses with measures of attention, 
rumination, and mood.  Consistent with Nair (2008), the current study explored a 
relationship between higher rumination scores and neural activity related to better 
cognitive control of memory.  Based on research by Cowan (1999) and others, attention 
and working memory span scores generated from performance on the ANT and SSPAN 
were expected to be related to better cognitive control and better overall performance on 
the memory tasks. 
Hypothesis 3: Clinical Measures Analysis 
Previous research suggested that mood (Matt et al., 1992) and attention (Redick & 
Engle, 2006) play significant roles in memory processes.  Mindfulness is defined as 
having a major component of attention training (Bishop et al., 2004), suggesting that 
those higher in mindfulness may differ substantively in their attentional abilities from 
those who do not.  This relationship has been confirmed in a number of studies (Jha et al., 
2007; Lutz et al., 2009; Tang et al., 2007; Valentine & Sweet, 1999).  Consequently, 
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clinical and cognitive measures administered during testing were anticipated to correlate 
with memory performance variables, both recall and ERP data.  Significant relationships 
were anticipated with mindfulness, depressive ideation, rumination, attention, and 
working memory span.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: METHOD 
Participants 
A total of 57 participants were initially recruited from the university subject pool 
and participated in an initial pretesting session.  All met inclusion criteria that they be 18 
years-old or older, native speakers of English (although they could also have spoken 
another language from birth), and right-hand dominant (laterality quotient > +70) with no 
underlying neurological or vision problems that could preclude performance.  In addition, 
each endorsed sufficient normal vision or corrected-to-normal vision to view a computer 
screen presenting images for an extended period of time and denied a history of negative 
reactions to similar situations (i.e., headaches or seizures).  During pretesting, 3 students 
met a safety exclusion criterion by endorsing current suicidal ideation on the Beck 
Depression Inventory-Short Form (BDI-SF), a measure of depressive symptoms.  In 
general, these participants scored highly, two meeting the diagnostic cutoff for depression 
(M = 13.7), although total BDI-SF score was not considered for exclusion.  These 
participants were immediately referred to the on-campus counseling center and exempted 
from further participation with full credit.  No participants were excluded for existing 
visual, learning, or attention problems that would render them unable to safely and 
effectively participate.  Nevertheless, the necessity of breaking the study into two 
sessions to reduce participant fatigue resulted in a fair amount of attrition between 
pretesting and the primary testing session.  In all, 12 participants (21%) either did not 
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attend or were unable to schedule a follow-up appointment within one week of pretesting. 
Anecdotal reports indicated that participant loss was due primarily to students choosing 
not to participate after having met departmental research requirements and, secondly, to 
difficulty scheduling a follow-up session within one week of pretesting.  
Thus, 42 participants were enrolled in the primary stage of the study.  Three 
participants failed to complete data collection.  Mechanical failure resulted in the loss of 
one participant’s data.  One participant withdrew due to scalp irritation during the initial 
step of the primary task.  Another participant withdrew prior to the primary task because 
she realized she had an appointment and would be unable to finish the study.  Of the 39 
remaining participants, an additional four failed preliminary data review.  This included 
an analysis of memory recall to assess fundamental task compliance.  Two participants 
were outliers, obtaining total recall percentages of 5% and 14%, and were dropped from 
further analyses.  Electroencephalographic (EEG) data was also reviewed for task 
compliance.  Two participants demonstrated excessive artifact in their recordings that 
precluded their inclusion in analyses.  One participant demonstrated eye-blink and 
movement artifact such that fewer than 200 trials were acceptable for analysis (n = 115).  
A minimum of 200 trials were deemed necessary to form four reliable individual 
waveforms from averaged trials.  A second participant was rejected for excessive 
somnolence-related artifact (alpha waves) that resulted in a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) 
that was an outlier when compared to other participants.  High SNR is an indication of 
excessive noise that dilutes sought-after brain activity.  
An exploratory analysis on demographic variables was completed on participants 
who were included in the study versus those who were not included.  The two groups did 
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not differ significantly on gender, ethnicity, age, or year in school.  Due to the low size of 
the rejected sample and potential for a Type II Error, a qualitative review was conducted.  
Results suggested that participants not included in analyses were somewhat more often 
African American (nAA = 8, 36%), younger (Mage = 21.7 years, SDage = 6.1), and 
lowerclassmen (nclass = 18, 82%) than those whose data were included (nAA = 6, 17%; 
Mage = 23.8 years, SDage = 6.1; nclass = 19, 56%).  In addition, a brief comparison between 
the 21 of the 22 participants who did not complete the study and the 35 who did 
conducted on measures completed by all participants at the pretesting session produced 
only one significant difference on the WBSI after accounting for unequal variances, 
t(50.12) = -2.15, p = .036, 95% CI[-10.58, -0.36].  The means indicated that excluded 
participants scored approximately 5.5 points higher than included participants on average.  
Another comparison suggested a trend for included participants to endorse less judging of 
their internal experiences than excluded participants, t(54) = 1.78, p = .078, 95% CI[-
0.40, 7.23].  Together, these measures suggest that excluded participants may have 
experienced somewhat worse difficulty reducing negative self-judgments.  Given these 
findings, the current study appeared to have initially recruited a larger proportion of 
minority students, although the excess was lost to attrition.  Otherwise, group differences 
appear to suggest that desirable variability in mood-related cognitive control was 
removed from the sample, perhaps biasing the results towards a null finding.  However, 
there is no evidence of any bias that would render further analysis invalid. 
The final sample comprised 35 students who approximated the general student 
population (see Table 1 for participant demographics).  They were evenly male and 
female (n = 17; 49%), average aged (M = 23.84, SD = 6.14), and representative of the 
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racial distribution of the university in 2009 [χ
2
(3, N = 17,646) = 0.47, p = 0.926, 
Cramer’s φ = 0.00, when compared across the four groups represented in this sample].  
Several participants reported mild discomfort during the ERP data collection, but only 
one participant (see above) reported more than momentary discomfort.   
Measures 
The following self-report measures were administered to assess participants on 
their level of mindfulness, both dispositional and multifaceted, intrusive thoughts, 
rumination, depressive symptoms, and current stress level (see Appendix B for all 
measures).  In addition, a simple biographical information form was administered to 
record basic demographic information and to identify those with existing conditions that 
would limit their ability to participate in the study.  The measures were given in two 
stages, a pretesting session and a primary testing session.  Composition of the packets is 
described in the Procedure. 
Demographic and Descriptive Measures 
Biographical information form 
A basic two-part demographic form was administered at the start of each session 
that included elements relevant to EEG recordings.  Data collected included self-reports 
of basic descriptive or demographic information, prior exposure to foreign languages, 
self-report of handedness, vision, and learning difficulties, neurological problems, head 
traumas, losses of consciousness, seizures, or medications likely to affect participation.  
This information was used to elicit information relevant to possible concerns of 
participating but did not serve as defined exclusion criteria.  The measure took 
approximately 4 minutes to administer.  Additional questions asked at the beginning of 
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the primary session recorded participant estimates of the amount of sleep obtained the 
night before and time since the last food eaten to record conditions at testing.  This 
information will be used to record experiment conditions, not for exclusion purposes.  It 
took approximately 2 minutes to administer. 
Handedness 
Consistent with research showing hand-dominance-related laterality differences in 
functional neuroanatomy that can affect ERP recordings (Alexander & Polich, 1995), a 
modified version of the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI) was administered at 
pretesting to quantify the degree of right handedness reported by participants.  Originally 
published by Oldfield (1971) and updated by Dragovic (2004) to improve its statistical 
properties and ease of administration (Williams, 2008), the current version is an 8-item 
self-report measure of actual handedness behaviors on a number of common tasks.  
Scores were recorded using a 5-point Likert-type scale from -2 (always left) to +2 
(always right).  A laterality quotient (LQ) to categorize hand preference was computed by 
adding all scores together, dividing them by the sum of the absolute values of all scores, 
and multiplying by 100 [(Σ x/Σ |x|) * 100].  Scores range from -100 to +100, and those 
scoring lower than +70 have been suggested as having biologically different physiology 
than those who score +100 (Schacter, 2000).  Thus, LQ scores lower than +70 resulted in 
exclusion for the present study.  The measure took approximately 3 minutes to 
administer. 
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Mindfulness Measures 
Dispositional mindfulness 
To record aspects of participant exposure to and practice of mindfulness-related 
qualities, two mindfulness questionnaires were given at pretesting and during the primary 
testing session.  To identify participants’ levels of day-to-day mental focus or 
mindfulness, the current study included the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; 
Brown & Ryan, 2003), a 15-item, self-report scale assessing a single factor related to 
one’s ability to stay mindful in the moment instead of becoming distracted or losing focus 
on the task at hand.  Because it assesses more stable traits, it has been described as a 
measure of dispositional mindfulness.  Items were scored on a 6-point Likert scale from 1 
―Almost Always‖ to 6 ―Almost Never‖ giving a range of total scores from 6–36 and 
include text such as ―I tend to walk quickly to get where I’m going without paying 
attention to what I experience along the way‖ and ―I do jobs or tasks automatically, 
without being aware of what I'm doing.‖  Brown and Ryan reported internal consistencies 
of .82 for college students and .87 in adults, and a four-week test-retest reliability of .81 
(2003).  Administration took approximately 5 minutes. 
Multifaceted mindfulness measure 
The Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ) is a 39-item, self-report 
measure of one’s experience with five different elements of mindfulness, each 
corresponding to its own subscale (Baer et al., 2008).  These are Observing, Describing, 
Acting with Awareness, Nonjudging of Inner Experience, and Nonreactivity to Inner 
Experience.  Items are scored on five-point Likert-type scale from 1 (never or very rarely 
true) to 5 (very often or always true).  Possible scores range from 8–40 (7–35 for non-
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reactivity).  The authors have reported adequate to good internal consistencies in multiple 
types of samples (r = .67–.92).  To respond to the items, participants are asked to choose 
the answer ―that best described your own opinion of what is generally true for you.‖  
Sample items include ―I watch my feelings without getting lost in them‖ and ―I notice the 
smells and aromas of things.‖  The measure has been validated in a number of types of 
participants, including undergraduates, meditators, and nonmeditators.  The questionnaire 
took approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
Control over Intrusive Thoughts 
Rumination Measure 
 To quantify a person’s tendency towards ruminative cognitive patterns, 
particularly depressive rumination, the current study administered the Ruminative 
Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), a 22-item, self-report 
measure of rumination that assesses persistent thinking about the possible causes, 
meaning, or consequences of dysphoric mood.  This scale was the first administered 
during the primary data collection session.  Items were rated on a Likert scale from 1 
(almost never) to 4 (almost always) and possible scores range from 22–88.  The scale has 
reported Cronbach alphas of .89 (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and .90 with a 
reported test-retest reliability of .67 (Treynor et al., 2003).  All items are prefaced by the 
phrase ―How often do you‖ and include content related to depression such as ―Think 
about how passive and unmotivated you feel‖ and ―Think about all your shortcomings, 
failings, faults, mistakes.‖  Additional analyses provided scores on two 5-item subscales.  
Treynor et al. described the Reflection subscale as indicating a more adaptive focus on 
mood-related cognitive problem-solving (sample item: ―Analyze recent events to try to 
59 
 
understand why you are depressed?‖) while the Brooding subscale represents a more 
passive, negative focus on the causes for one’s negative mood (sample item: ―Think 
―What am I doing to deserve this?‖).  Both scales show adequate internal consistency 
with Cronbach alphas of .71 and .77, respectively (Miranda & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007).  
The measure took 4–6 minutes to administer 
Thought Suppression   
To help identify failed attempts at cognitive control through thought suppression, 
the current study administered a widely used questionnaire assessing suppression of 
intrusive thoughts.  The White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 
1994) is a 15-item, self-report measure with item scores ranging from 1 ―Strongly 
Disagree‖ to 5 ―Strongly Agree‖ and total scores that range from 15–75.  Internal 
consistency was reported at alpha = .89, and one-week test-retest reliability was .92.  
Items have content such as ―I have thoughts that I cannot stop‖ and ―Sometimes I really 
wish I could stop thinking.‖  Although this measure has been widely used in research into 
intrusive thoughts, some have criticized it as being too narrowly focused and a measure 
of only failed attempts at suppressing intrusive thoughts (Rassin, 2003).  The measure 
took about 5 minutes to complete 
Attention and Working Memory  
Attention 
The Attention Network Test-Short Form (ANT; Fan, 2003; Fan et al., 2002) is a 
computer-administered cognitive test of attention that quantifies participants’ attentional 
abilities in three domains: Alerting, Orienting, and Conflict.  Using a unique integration 
of two cognitive tasks built off extended research into attention by Posner, Fan, and 
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others, the ANT assesses attention performance on three interrelated, empirically-derived 
networks based on established neuroanatomical pathways.  The Alerting domain assesses 
one’s ability to achieve and maintain an alert state when needed.  Orienting quantifies 
how well one applies directional focus to a selected sensory input, and Conflict quantifies 
one’s effectiveness at using cognitive control to resolve attentional conflicts.  The task 
involves variations on two simple and widely used cognitive tasks: a cuing task and a 
flanker task (see Figure 4).  A trial consists of a fixation cross appearing on a gray screen 
for a variable period of time (400-1600 ms), followed by a warning cue (an asterisk *) 
presented above or below the center cross for 100 ms.  After a fixation period of 400 ms, 
a string of five arrows is presented above or below the fixation cross.  The center arrow is 
presented at the exact position of the warning cue pointed in either the same or opposite 
direction as four neighboring arrows (two on each side) pointing to the left or to the right.  
The participant’s task is simply to press the left- or right-arrow key within 1700 ms if the 
center, cued arrow is pointing left or right.  Scores produced include mean accuracy and 
reaction time for each domain.  The target and distracter arrow directions and cued 
position vary by condition.  The entire task took approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
The current study used the short form of the ANT (Fan, 2003), which reduces 
administration time by eliminating the neutral flanker condition (dashes instead of 
arrows) and double-cued condition (both above and below).  Three composite scores are 
still generated from means of median reaction time scores generated during the task. 
Alerting scores are formed by subtracting the mean of median scores for all center cued 
trials (providing a temporal cue but not a spatial cue) from the average median scores for 
all uncued stimuli (no temporal or spatial cue).  Higher Alerting scores indicate lower 
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benefit from temporal cueing.  Orienting scores are formed by subtracting the average of 
spatial and temporal cues provided above and below the fixation cross from the central 
cue, which provides temporal cueing without spatial cueing.  Higher Orienting scores 
suggest lower ability to use spatial cueing.  Conflict scores are formed by subtracting the 
mean of median reaction time scores to all congruent trials from the mean of median 
scores for all incongruent trials.  Higher Conflict scores indicate greater disruption of 
cognitive processes when required to process incongruent stimuli. 
Working Memory 
The automated symmetry span task (SSPAN) is a computer-administered working 
memory task that uses images instead of text to test a person’s ability to maintain an idea 
in active memory while simultaneously completing another type of processing task.  One 
of a number of automated working memory span tasks created by Unsworth, Heitz, 
Schrock, and Engle (2005), it provides a visual/spatial paradigm for assessing working 
memory capacity and efficiency that appears to represent a consistent mechanism across 
multiple stimulus types (Unsworth, Redick, Heitz, Broadway, & Engle, 2009).  To begin, 
participants were trained to remember the spatial placement of red boxes presented 
sequentially on a 4 x 4 grid of 16 white boxes.  Each red box was shown for 650 ms with 
a 500 ms inter-trial interval (see Figure 5).  Participants were then asked to recall the red 
boxes and use a mouse to click sequentially on the matrix where the boxes were 
displayed.  Feedback on performance was provided.  For the next part of the task, 
participants were presented with black and white boxes laid out on an 8 x 8 grid with 
varying spatial compositions and were asked to decide if the figures were symmetrical 
about the vertical centerline or not.  Feedback was provided and reaction time was 
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recorded for each trial. Finally, the two tasks were combined such that participants were 
to recall sequences of 2-5 red boxes presented randomly after completing the symmetry 
decision task.  Each red box in sequence was counted for accuracy with three trials for 
each length for a total of 42 possible correct responses.  Response time for this portion of 
the task was limited to the participant’s mean reaction time to the symmetry task alone 
plus 2.5 SDs.  Scores provided include absolute accuracy score, a sum of the set lengths 
for which the participant had perfect performance (range: 2–42); total recall score, a sum 
of all correct responses; and error scores for the symmetry task, composed of two scores: 
failures to respond during the time allowed (speed errors) and failures to correctly 
determine whether the image was symmetrical (accuracy).  Cronbach α’s are .80 for 
recall scores (red boxes), .84 for processing accuracy (symmetry task), and .99 for 
processing time (duration errors), and test-retest reliability was reported as r139 = 0.77 
(Unsworth et al, 2008).  The entire task took 20-25 minutes to complete and was 
followed after a short break by the T/NT task (described below).  
Clinically Relevant Measures 
Depression Symptoms 
To assess participants’ levels of current depressive symptomatology, a special 
short form of the Beck Depression Inventory was used that eliminates some questions 
which load primarily on somatic, physical, or performance-related symptoms of 
depression (BDI-SF; Beck & Beck, 1972; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).  Based on the 
21-item, empirically validated, clinical self-report measure of depressive symptoms and 
severity that was created to assess DSM criteria for depressive disorders (APA, 2000), 
the BDI-SF is composed of  the 13 cognitive-affective items with a recommended cutoff 
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of 10 for the identification of moderate to severe depressive syndromes (Beck, Steer, et 
al.).  More recent research by Furlanetto, Mendlowicz, and Bueno (2004) has indicated 
that a cutoff of 10 is effective for screening purposes (sensitivity = 100%) and 13 for 
diagnosis (specificity = 96%).  Consequently, the BDI-SF is effective in environments, 
such as primary care, where somatic symptoms may be prominent and in research which 
focuses on cognitive aspects of depressive dysfunction.  Item scores range from 0–3, and 
total scores range from 0–39.  Beck and Beck reported that the short form correlated with 
the long form at .96.  Cronbach’s α for the short form has been reported at .87 (Sheier, 
Carver, & Bridges, 1994).  Scale norms have been validated in both genders and in 
multiple ethnic populations.  Items are given as domains for which test-takers must 
choose the statement with which they best agree based on how they have felt over the last 
two weeks.  For Sadness, the items are ―I do not feel sad‖ (0 pts), ―I feel sad much of the 
time‖ (1 pt), ―I am sad all the time‖ (2 pts), and ―I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand 
it.‖  The measure took approximately 5 minutes to complete. 
Perceived stress measure 
To identify and quantify the effects of stress on cognitive performance, as 
described by Hertel and colleagues (Hertel & Calcaterra, 2005; Hertel & Gerstle, 2003; 
Hertel & Mahan, 2008), the study administered the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen, 
Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983; Cohen & Williamson, 1988), a self-report questionnaire 
of stress from situations arising in the past month.  In particular, it identifies the extent to 
which participants perceive their lives as unpredictable, uncontrollable, and overloaded.  
Item scores are on a 5-point Likert scale and range from 0 ―never‖ to 4 ―very often‖ for a 
range of total scores from 0–56.  The 10-item version produced an internal consistency of 
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.78 and a two-day test-retest reliability of .85.  Sample items include: ―In the last month, 
how often have you been upset because of something that happened unexpectedly?‖ and 
―In the last month, how often have you found that you could not cope with all the things 
that you had to do?‖  The scale took approximately 3 minutes to administer. 
Debriefing measure 
At the end of the study, participants were administered a short debriefing 
questionnaire.  First, questions covered information about memory strategies employed, 
control strategies used to prevent recall of a memory, stimulus characteristics, 
distractions during the task, their perceived performance on the task, reasons they might 
have done well or poorly, and previous exposure to mindfulness or meditation.  
Participants responded on a single Likert scale giving a self-assessment of their 
performance on the task.  Then, participants were given a brief description of the study, 
verbally and in writing, including a rationale for its components.  The information sheet 
included the IRB number and contact information for the principal investigator.  
Questions were solicited and answered if possible.  This portion of the study took 
approximately 10 minutes.   
T/NT Memory Suppression Task 
The main component of this study is a computer-administered cognitive task that 
quantified participant ability to use cognitive control processes to facilitate or inhibit 
memory retrieval of images on demand.  Termed the think/no-think task (T/NT), it 
requires the participant to selectively inhibit the recall of some learned pairings while 
actively trying to remember others.  Rather than words, the stimuli in this study were the 
same images as those used in the Depue et al. (2006) adaptation of the T/NT task: 80 
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neutral faces (40 males and 40 females) that were paired with 80 pictures (40 with 
negative content and 40 with positive) from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008).  See Figure 6 and Figure 7 for example 
images.  The IAPS is a standardized collection of affectively ranked pictures available for 
use in research.  Each picture is assigned a valence score based on the average of rater 
reactions to the image on a 9-point scale from 1 ―very negative‖ to 9 ―very positive.‖ 
Negative images were used to help identify the effects of negatively valenced stimuli on 
memory.  Neutral images provided the comparison condition.  No positive images were 
included.  As reported by Depue et al. (2006), the full set of negative images has a mean 
rating of 2.4 (SD = 0.51), while the neutral images have a mean rating of 4.4 (SD = 0.23). 
Training Phase 
The three stages to the task are an initial training phase, the experimental phase, 
and a final recall phase.  During the training phase, all 80 face photos were paired with a 
picture image and displayed in pairs on a screen with a black background for 3.5 seconds 
(see Figure 8).  The two pictures appeared side-by-side.  Face photos appeared centered 
vertically and were aligned to the edge of the screen on the left side and to the vertical 
centerline on their right side.  Picture images were centered vertically and aligned to the 
vertical centerline on their left side and the edge of the screen on their right side.  All 
pictures are the same size (225 x 225 pixels).  Each presentation was followed by a 0.5-
second intertrial interval featuring a medium gray fixation cross in the center of the 
screen.  All pairings were presented in a random order in blocks of 20 and cycled three 
times.  To ensure high memory for stimulus pairs, a final fourth cycle of training was 
administered in one continuous task that randomly displayed all stimuli, using a harder 
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recognition testing paradigm to improve memory of paired stimuli.  On all cycles, all 
blocks were balanced by photo gender and image valence.  At the end of each block, a 
recognition test reinforced learned pairings and generated a measure of initial learning. 
During the recognition test administered after each subset of 20 stimuli in the first 
three training cycles, participants were shown one face photo from the subset as a 
memory cue stimulus centered vertically on the left half of the screen.  On the right half, 
two picture images were shown, one above the other, in a randomized position (see 
Figure 9).  One was the correct match (target) for the face-cue photo while the other was 
a matched distracter image chosen at random without replacement from the pool of 20 
picture images.  The distracter varied across cue-faces but not across subsets.  Using a 
standard response box, the participant’s task was to press the button clearly labeled ―T‖ 
(the left button) if the correct target image was on top or to press the ―B‖ (the right 
button) if the correct target image was on the bottom.  Following each response was a 
0.5-second inter-trial interval that displayed a medium gray cross in the center of the 
screen.  This continued until the participant saw each of the 80 pairings three times.  This 
method was previously shown to produce competent learning of the pairings (Nair, 2008) 
and previous research suggests effective learning of face-picture pairings after three 
presentations (Depue et al., 2006).   
For the fourth cycle, a new training paradigm was used that was designed to 
produce better learning of the stimulus pairings.  Instead of four blocks of 20 stimuli, 
participants were shown all 80 stimuli in one block.  As before, the participant was asked 
to choose between two images.  However, the distractor image on this task came from 
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any of the other 79 images available without replacement.  The increased difficulty of 
this task should have produced better learning in the participants.   
Experimental Phase 
The experimental portion of the task used 64 of the 80 pairings, 32 neutral pairs 
and 32 negative pairs.  The remaining pairings (16) were reserved as baseline stimuli for 
the final memory recall portion of the task.  All of the stimuli in each valence condition 
(neutral or negative) were randomly assigned to the think condition or no-think condition.  
Each trial consisted of a face photo presented as a memory cue for 3.5 seconds on a black 
screen (see Figure 10).  The photo was centered both vertically and horizontally.  The 
stimulus was followed by a 0.5-second inter-trial interval that displayed a medium gray 
fixation cross in the center of the screen.  For each photo cue (image size: 225 x 225), a 
30-mm border was extended from it on all four sides.  The color of the border varied 
based on the condition of the trial: a green border indicated a think trial, and a red border 
indicated a no-think trial.  For trials with a green border, participants were instructed to 
make an effort to think consciously about the picture target that was learned with the face 
cue.  For trials with a red border, participants were instructed to make an effort to let the 
previously learned picture target come into conscious awareness.  Each of the 64 stimuli 
was viewed 10 times.  After every two cycles, a short, one-minute break was given to 
allow participants to rest their eyes.  If necessary, this break was extended to allow the 
participants more time if requested.   
Recall Phase 
The final phase of the task was a memory recall test.  The task tested participant 
memory for all 80 faces learned during the T/NT task.  Each cue face was presented for 8 
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seconds (see Figure 11), giving the participant time to form a two-to-five-word response 
describing the face’s matching picture.  After completing a response, the participant was 
able to push a button to advance immediately to the next stimulus if desired.  Most 
participants found it unnecessary to proceed more rapidly.  Between each cue, an inter-
trial interval of 0.5 seconds displayed a medium gray fixation cross in the center of the 
screen.  Each participant response was recorded verbatim on a response sheet that 
replicated the photo cues being displayed to ensure accurate pairing of responses with the 
photo cue. 
ERP Recording 
During the experimental phase, continuous electroencephalograms (EEGs) were 
recorded from 38 sintered Ag/AgCl electrodes.  Electrodes were embedded on a 
Neuroscan Quick-Cap (Compumedics USA, Charlotte, NC) consistent with the 
International 10-20 system and situated over the midline central site at the center of the 
scalp.  Bipolar ocular activity was recorded from the supra-orbital and infra-orbital areas 
above and below the left eye (VEOG) and the left and right canthi (HEOG) on the outside 
of the right and left eyes.  Electrode impedances were reduced to 5 kOhms or less.  The 
activity at a single electrode, placed on the bridge of the nose near the tip and isolated 
from most brain activity, was used as the reference channel and subtracted from all other 
channels.  The signal was digitized in 32-bit acquisition by a Neuroscan NuAmps 
amplifier from DC to 300 Hz at a rate of 500 points per second.  No notch filter was 
applied.  Offline, the data was band-pass filtered from .01–30 Hz and visually inspected.  
Channels experiencing poor performance and sections displaying extensive artifact were 
manually rejected.  EEG data was then sectioned into 1200-ms, stimulus-locked epochs, 
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from -200 ms before the stimulus to 1000 ms after, each having 601 samples.  A spline fit 
was applied to allow analyses in the frequency domain.  After baseline correction, all 
epochs were automatically rejected if voltage amplitudes exceed +/- 70 µV.  A sample of 
accepted trials was confirmed not to contain significant eye artifact, and rejected trials 
were verified as containing an inappropriate level of eye artifact.  No artifact reduction 
was used.  Individual averages of epochs were formed for each experimental condition by 
participant.  Participants amassing fewer than 200 accepted trials (~ 50 per condition) for 
were rejected.  Grand averages were then computed overall for each condition using all 
accepted participant data.   
Procedure 
The current study was reviewed thoroughly by the university’s Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) and approved with some recommendations.  Due to the negative 
content in the photos used, the IRB required some alterations to the design.  Among these 
was the exclusion of any participants experiencing current suicidal ideation.  Such results 
were to be discussed immediately with the participants by the author, an advanced 
doctoral student in clinical psychology.  Information on free counseling services available 
on campus was provided and the participant was accompanied to the on-campus 
counseling center if desired.  Although three subjects were excluded from further 
participation due to suicidal ideation, none requested an escort to the counseling center or 
indicated active suicidal ideation.  Another requirement of the IRB was to provide 
participants with credit completed through pretesting rather than provide all credit at one 
time upon study completion.  
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Participants were recruited from the psychology department participant pool and 
received research credit to meet departmental requirements.  All researchers were 
provided and used a detailed script (see Appendix A) describing the study to ensure 
consistency in study presentation across researchers.  Participants initially registered for 
participation in a group pretesting appointment, which began with a detailed disclosure of 
risks to participation.  Risks included a negative reaction to introspection or from 
assessment of depressive symptomatology, lowering of self-confidence if participant had 
difficulty completing tasks, and cognitive and/or emotional fatigue due to testing.  
Because the current study included pictures with negative emotional material, there was 
also a slightly increased risk for a negative reaction to these materials.  Consequently, the 
precautions described above were taken to avoid any negative result from the use of 
negatively-themed stimuli.  However, the severity of the negative content was no worse 
than images shown on the evening news.  Such risks are common to psychological 
research, and any negative occurrences led to immediate referral to the counseling center, 
including accompaniment to the counseling center if desired.  The consent procedure 
took approximately 10 minutes.   
If participants provided consent, they were assigned a number and administered a 
pretest packet.  Measures were organized into two packets and administered in a 
consistent sequence for all participants.  The pretest packet was composed of a 
biographical information form, the EHI-R, the BDI-SF, the FFMQ, the WBSI, and the 
PSS.  Each measure was explained to the participant separately to promote attention to 
the task, and each response form was reviewed with the participant to ensure that it was 
completed in good faith and to identify any unintentionally skipped items or errors.  Each 
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participant was met with privately to review their responses and schedule their timeslot 
for the primary session.  At this  time and thus before exposure to negative stimuli, scores 
on the BDI-SF item assessing suicidal ideation were reviewed and appropriate referrals 
were made to the counseling center if suicidal ideation had been endorsed.  Participants 
endorsing this item were exempted from further participation with full research credit.  
Other participants received credit for the time they invested with additional credit 
available upon completion of the primary session.  Pretesting time varied from 20-45 
minutes. 
Despite requiring another visit, the majority of participants returned for the 
second and primary testing session.  Upon arrival, they were reminded again of the study 
risks and verbal consent was obtained to continue.  Participants then completed a short 
information form asking about their sleep, diet, vision, and medicine usage for the 
previous 24 hours, the RRS, and the MAAS.  If participants had not eaten for a number of 
hours, they were provided a short break and invited to have a snack.  If they did not have 
one or could not obtain one, a small snack was provided for them.  Most participants 
were provided with a soft drink from a nearby vending machine.  After a brief break, 
participants were seated at the testing computer, and their distance from the screen was 
measured to ensure they were approximately 60 cm away, following recommendations 
for the ANT.  Once comfortable, the computer-administered tasks were started. 
Instructions for the first task, a short measure of attention known as the ANT, 
were presented on the screen, and participants were given an opportunity to discuss these 
instructions before starting.  The ANT has a 2-minute practice and 5–7-minute testing 
period.  Most participants completed the task in less than 15 minutes.  After completion, 
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the SSPAN task, a short measure of working memory span, was begun, and again, 
participants were given the opportunity to ask questions about the task, which took 
approximately 20 minutes including questions.   
After completion of the ANT and SSPAN tasks and a short break but prior to 
starting the final cognitive task, participants were fitted with a 40-channel electrode cap.  
Five points on the scalp and face were swabbed with alcohol, and then cleaned with a 
slight facial abrasive and a sterile cotton swab.  To these spots, a small amount of water-
soluble, hypoallergenic, electro-conductive gel was applied to improve conductance 
between the skin and five electrodes that were taped (with standard medical tape) to sites 
on the head.  The remaining electrodes in the cap also received conductive gel to 
complete the preparation of the subject.  This procedure took around 30 minutes per 
participant.  Approximately 10 minutes into the cap application, the participant began the 
cognitive task. 
The computer-administered task was presented using E-Prime stimulus software 
(Version 1.1-SP3, Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA) on a Dell Optiplex 
GX280 desktop computer connected to a 17-inch, flat-screen Dell monitor.  The 
participant was seated comfortably in a lighted room approximately 60 cm from the 
screen.  The initial training block of the T/NT task took approximately 45 minutes, during 
which time, research assistants completed cap application by ensuring that all electrodes 
were recording at low impedances (< 5 kOhms).  The experimental portion of the task 
took approximately 50 minutes, during which time the participant regarded cue images 
and attempted to recall or avoid recalling the paired image.  Continous EEG recordings 
were saved throughout the experimental portion of the test.  Unless the participant 
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expressed discomfort or requested a break, the QuikCap remained on the participant 
during the final recall portion of the experiment, when participants described recalled 
images when provided with a face cue.  The recall phase took approximately 15 minutes.  
Participants produced a recall score for each of 80 stimuli, ranging from 0–80.  Recall 
data was scored 1 for a correct trial or 0 for an incorrect trial or no response.  Upon 
completion of the T/NT task, the cap was removed, and the participant was provided 
materials to assist in cleaning off electrode gel, if desired.  During this time, debriefing 
occurred, and any participant questions were answered.  The total primary testing session 
duration ran 2.5 hours, including breaks.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: RESULTS 
Data Preparation and Preliminary Analyses 
Demographic Analysis 
Participant characteristics for the 35 participants included in this study are 
presented in Table 1.  The participants were evenly male (n = 18; 51%) and female (n = 
17; 49%), χ
2
 (1, N = 35) = 0.03, p = 0.866, φ = .03); aged 18–45 years old (M = 23.8 yrs; 
SD = 6.14); and racially representative of the student body and mostly freshman.  Most 
(77%) fell in the age range between 18–25 yrs, while 5 (14%) were in their 30s and 1 
(3%) in his/her 40s.  The students were White (n = 23; 66%), Black (n = 6; 17%), 
Latino/a (n = 2; 6%), and Asian American (n = 4; 11%).  In addition, the largest number 
of participants were Freshman (n = 12, 35%), followed by Juniors (n = 8; 24%), 
Sophomores (n = 7, 21%), Seniors (n = 6; 18%), and Post-baccalaureate students (n = 1; 
3%).  Students did not vary significantly across years, χ2 (4, N = 35) = 4.02, p = .404, φ = 
.34).   
By self-report, all participants claimed to be right-hand dominant.  LQ scores 
generated from responses on the EHI-R indicated that only one participant endorsed 
mixed handedness (LQ = 75), which did not meet the exclusion criteria of an LQ < +70.  
All other participants (97%) had an LQ = 100, achieving a mean of 99.3 (SD = 4.23).  
Thus, no participants were excluded for mixed handedness.  
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All participants were native speakers of English and denied a history of seizures 
or any medical condition that might affect their performance.  Three (9%) reported taking 
medication that could potentially affect their performance (e.g., antidepressants, 
antipsychotics, stimulants, and allergy medicine), but no obvious performance effects 
were noted in their scores.  Of 11 participants (31%) who reported needing glasses to 
read text on a computer screen, 8 (23%) wore contacts and 3 (9%) wore glasses for the 
duration of the study.    
Debriefing Questionnaire Data 
A qualitative review of questions posed on the debriefing questionnaire provided 
useful information about participant performance on the cognitive control aspects of the 
T/NT.  However, no participants were excluded based on their responses.  Participants 
endorsed two distinct types of strategies to remember pairings, sometimes using both at 
the same time.  One strategy was to associate features of the photo cue with the image 
itself.  A second strategy was to create a story that integrated the cue photo person into a 
story that explained the image shown to the participant. Although not quantitative, 
anecdotal reports suggest that the use of the second strategy produced more robust 
memory for the paired stimuli.  Similarly, suppression strategies included a range of 
techniques.  Participants generally endorsed a variation on a substitution strategy, such as 
thinking about a new thought or remembering just a simple detail of the cue.  However, 
some endorsed self-distraction by, for example, singing a song to themselves while others 
endorsed direct suppression attempts.  Participants generally stated that they found it 
somewhat more difficult to suppress negative images than neutral images, although some 
reported an opposite pattern. Participants reported some mild discomfort and fatigue as 
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distracting during the task, but denied any major problems.  Using a five-point Likert-
type scale from 1 (really well) to 5 (really poorly), most participants endorsed doing well 
on the task (M = 2.54, SD = 0.76).  No participants endorsed very poor effort, and none 
were excluded on the basis of this item.  Finally, students endorsed varying levels of 
exposure to mindfulness or meditation training, but none endorsed competence, regular 
practice, or advanced exposure to mindfulness techniques. 
Data Preparation 
Scales were computed according to published procedures for each test.  All data 
were entered into a database using SPSS for Windows (Release 16, Chicago, IL: SPSS 
Inc).  Resulting data were the following. 
 Mindfulness: MAAS (mean score for all items) and FFMQ (total scores 
for each subscale: observing, describing, acting with awareness, non-
judging of inner experience, and non-reactivity to inner experience); 
 Control over Intrusive Thoughts: WBSI (total score) and RRS (total and 
subscale scores for brooding and reflection); 
 Attention/Working Memory: ANT (alerting, orienting, and conflict scores) 
and SSPAN (scores representing absolute span performance, accuracy 
score, and total symmetry errors, which sums errors on duration and 
accuracy). 
 Clinically Relevant Measures: Depressive symptoms and perceived stress 
level were assessed using BDI-SF (total score) and PSS (total score). 
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Descriptive Analysis of Self-Report Psychometric Measures 
Preliminary analyses reviewed the descriptive information for psychometric 
measures administered (see Table 2 for descriptive information and correlations).   
Mindfulness 
On the MAAS, a measure of dispositional mindfulness or one’s awareness in day-
to-day life (possible range: 1–6), participants tended to endorse the presence of traits 
related to poor mindfulness as occurring ―somewhat infrequently‖ with an average score 
(M = 4.08, SD = 0.78).  These scores did not differ significantly from the scores obtained 
in the pilot study (N = 24, Mdn = 4.13, M = 4.06, SD = 0.68), t(57) = 0.26, p = .797, 95% 
CI[-0.44, 0.37].  
On the FFMQ, a measure assessing mindfulness-related attributes, participants 
scored in roughly the same pattern on all scales.  They were most likely to endorse items 
related to their daily experience of mindfulness-related attributes in the positive direction 
of ―sometimes true‖ to ―often true‖ (possible range: 8–40).  First, participants recorded a 
mean of 27.40 (SD = 5.11) on the FFMQ-Observe, a measure of their ability to engage in 
mindful observation.  For the FFMQ-Describe, a measure of how well people are able to 
describe their environment, participants obtained a mean score of 27.23 (SD =5.42).  On 
the FFMQ-Awareness, participants obtained a mean of 26.69 (SD = 5.99), suggesting that 
most participants were fairly ambivalent about their tendency to notice things going on 
around them.  On the FFMQ-Nonjudging factor, participants obtained a mean score of 
29.37 (SD = 6.96), suggesting a tendency away from evaluating their inner experience.  
On the final factor FFMQ-Nonreact (with a smaller range from 7-35), participants 
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obtained a score of 23.20 (SD = 3.43), suggesting they tend slightly towards endorsing a 
more reflective posture about themselves. 
Control over intrusive thoughts 
On the RRS, a measure that identifies and quantifies ruminative style (possible 
range: 22-88), participants endorsed symptoms of rumination averaging between 
responses of ―Never‖ and ―Sometimes‖ (M = 39.00, SD = 9.90).  On two important 5-
item subscales (range: 5-20), participants endorsed experiencing somewhat more 
brooding or depressive rumination (M = 9.17, SD = 2.56) than the more positive 
reflection (M = 8.54, SD = 3.24). 
On the WBSI (possible range: 15–75), a measure of attempts to control negative 
intrusive thoughts, participants endorsed total scores suggesting that they feel fairly 
unsure or neutral about their experience with intrusive thoughts (M = 47.03, SD = 10.93).  
 Clinically relevant measures 
Results of the BDI-SF (possible range: 0–39) indicated that most participants 
were experiencing few symptoms of depression (M = 3.66, SD = 3.35).  Using 
established cutoffs designed to screen for and assist in diagnosing depression to describe 
this sample (Furlanetto, Mendlowicz, & Bueno, 2005), only 1 participant (3%) exceeded 
the diagnostic cutoff with a 14.  Three other participants (10%) placed just below the 
screening cutoffs with scores of 9.  Of those excused from participation for endorsing 
some suicidal ideation on Item I, two met diagnostic cutoffs and the third scored a 13.  
Despite the use of the suicide item to exclude some participants, it is not without 
precedent to continue to use the measure in later analyses (e.g., Hertel & Mahan, 2008).  
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However, it should be noted that no participants were excluded due to their total scores 
and that a range of total scores was still obtained (0-14). 
On the PSS, a subjective assessment of stress experienced in the last month 
(possible range: 0–40), participants endorsed relatively low levels of stress (M = 17.17, 
SD = 7.82), suggesting that, in general, they experienced given stressors from ―Almost 
Never‖ to ―Sometimes.‖ 
Descriptive Data on Cognitive Measures 
Working memory 
Preliminary analyses reviewed the descriptive information for cognitive measures 
administered (see Table 3 for complete data).  Mean performance for the total score 
correct was 26.37 (SD = 8.89), and the range was from 5–42, nearly the entire possible 
range.  On absolute score correct, a sum of the sizes of entire sets successfully recalled, 
participants obtained a mean score of 16.46 (SD = 8.61), with the scores covering the 
entire possible range of positive scores (0–42).  These scores suggest that, for example, 
the average participant may have successfully remembered 2 sets of the 2 red-box 
sequences, all 3 sets of the 3 red-box sequences, and 1 set of the 4 red-box sequences for 
an absolute score of 17 while the lowest performing participant did not successfully recall 
any complete sets.  However, participants made few errors on the symmetry task (M = 
3.14, SD = 3.77), with few speed errors (M = 0.11, SD = 0.40) and several accuracy 
errors on average (M = 3.03, SD = 3.74).   
Attention 
On the ANT, which provides mean of median RT difference scores where higher 
scores indicate worse performance on each of three related, anatomically-derived 
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attention networks, participants obtained the following scores.  For the Alerting network, 
a measure of participant failure to use cueing well, the mean score was 19.90 ms (SD = 
26.93).  This score suggests that participants responded approximately 20 ms slower to a 
stimulus when not cued to its presentation, which was considerably better (Z = -1.51) 
than the normative sample reported by Fan et al. (2002).  (Note that a negative Z score 
represents lower error scores and, thus, better performance.)  For the Orienting network, 
participants obtained a mean score of 45.66 (SD = 46.77).  Thus, participants responded 
approximately 46 ms slower to a stimulus when not cued spatially to its future location.  
This score was slightly better (Z = -0.25) than the normative sample (Fan et al.). For the 
Conflict network assessing cognitive control, participants obtained a mean score of 
105.51 (SD = 36.97).  This score indicates that participants had somewhat more difficulty 
(Z = 0.86) than the normative sample at resolving cognitive conflicts produced by 
incongruent trials.  
Intercorrelation of cognitive measures 
Cognitive measures were analyzed for expected correlated activity (see Table 3).  
Within scales, the ANT network scores showed significant intercorrelation.  The largest 
relationship was a negative correlation between Conflict and Orienting, while Conflict 
also had a large positive relationship with Alerting.  Orienting and Alerting were also 
negatively related, indicating that these networks must be interrelated. 
SSPAN Absolute and Total scores were significantly related and both were 
negatively related to symmetry errors.  The symmetry errors score is composed of errors 
from both speed and accuracy.  Speed errors were not significant related to any other 
SSPAN measure.  
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Between measures, several significant correlations were identified.  The ANT 
Conflict scale produced a significant negative relationships with SSPAN Total score, r = 
-.34, p = .05, r
2
 = .12, and a large positive correlation with SSPAN symmetry errors, r = 
.64, p < .001, r
2
 = .40.  These relationships suggest that higher ANT Conflict scores, 
which represent more difficulty at resolving conflicting inputs using cognitive control, 
are linked to worse maintenance of a memory item while performing another task and 
more errors on that task.  The only other significant relationship was a negative 
correlation between the Orienting network and Symmetry errors.  
Primary Analyses 
Type I Error Caution 
The analyses in the following sections include a family of repeated-measures 
ANOVAs and correlational analyses.  No attempt was made to adjust α to control for 
familywise error rate or experimentwise error rate in these groups of analyses.  The 
decision was made to prioritize identifying relationships for future research over reducing 
the possibility of spurious findings.  However, these results should be taken with some 
caution, particularly those with significant effects that approach α = .05.  
Hypothesis 1 
Recall scores were hypothesized to show main effects for strategy (think > no-
think) and valence (neutral > negative).  An interaction was anticipated in which the 
effect of strategy was greater in the neutral condition than the negative condition.   
Data preparation 
Recall responses (2-5 word descriptions) obtained during the T/NT task were 
scored for accuracy by two raters, and all disagreements were adjudicated by a third 
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judge.  The author served as the first rater and was blind to the condition each picture was 
in for a particular participant (i.e., think vs. no-think) but not to hypotheses.  A second 
rater was naïve to all stimuli, the hypotheses being tested, and the manipulation of recall 
strategy or picture valence in the study.  Initial inter-rater agreement was 98% across all 
trials (N = 3,120) for all subjects scored (N = 39) and 96% across all valid responses (N = 
1,954).  A 3
rd
 rater blind to the strategy condition of each picture was used to adjudicate 
the small number (n = 73) of conflicting ratings.  Total percent-correct free recall across 
all conditions and subjects was 51.36% (SD = 18.04).  Percent recall scores for the 
experimental conditions, 2 Strategy x 2 Valence design, were baseline-corrected as 
recommended by Anderson and Green (2001) and Depue et al. (2006).  The baseline 
correction procedure subtracts off each participant’s percent-recall for items learned 
during training but not included in the T/NT task.  Unlike Depue et al. (2006), recall of 
baseline items in the negative condition (M = 38.9%; SD = 24.6%) did not differ 
significantly from recall of baseline items in the neutral condition (M = 39.3%; SD = 
25.9%), t(34) = -.10, p = .918, 95% CI[-7.38, 6.67].  Consequently, an overall mean 
baseline recall score was used instead of separate scores for negative and neutral items.  
The overall mean baseline recall was 39.1% (SD = 23.11).  Continued learning due to 
retrieval practice would result in positive means for think condition pairs due to higher 
recall than baseline.  Conversely, negative means for no-think condition pairs would 
indicate successful memory retrieval at a lower rate than baseline.  Anderson and Green 
(2001) have argued that negative scores represent a memory suppression effect due to 
repeated interruption of the retrieval process for pictures in the no-think condition.  
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To identify predicted patterns of recall, baseline-corrected recall scores were 
prepared as reported above and entered into a 2 Strategy (think vs. no-think)  x 2 Valence 
(negative vs. neutral) repeated-measures ANOVA.  The main effect for strategy showed 
that the think condition produced significantly higher recall (M = 23.7%, SD = 13.2%) 
than the no-think condition (M = 7.0%, SD = 12.0%), F(1, 34) = 64.11, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
.65.  The main effect for valence indicated that significantly more neutral items were 
recalled (M = 18.4%, SD = 12.1%) than negative items (M = 12.2%, SD = 12.8%), F(1, 
34) = 9.70, p = .004, ηp
2
 = .22.  The interaction of Strategy x Valence, however, failed to 
reach statistical significance, F(1, 34) = 3.02, p = .091, ηp
2
 = .08, observed power = .39.  
These main effects for the strategy and valence are consistent with prior research using 
these stimuli in the T/NT task (Depue et al., 2006) and two master’s theses in our lab 
(Dykstra, 2009; Nair, 2008).  However, the interaction found in Depue et al. (2006) failed 
to emerge.  A review of means indicated that think items had a higher mean percent-
correct than no-think items for both negative, t(34) = 4.37, p < .001, 95% CI[6.98, 19.1], 
and neutral items, t(34) = 6.91, p < .001, 95% CI[14.4, 26.3].  The interaction term 
above, then, represented a non-significant trend for the think advantage to be greater (M = 
+20.4%) for neutral items than for negative items (M = +13.0 %).  This pattern of a 
greater strategy effect for neutral than for negative items conflicts with the results of 
Depue et al. (2006) using these same stimuli, who found the effect of strategy 
significantly greater in negative items rather than neutral items.  In addition, post-hoc 
analyses of each of the 4 baseline-corrected means indicated that all means were 
significantly greater than 0 (all ps < .026 for one-sample t-tests).  Thus, these data again 
failed to produce significant below baseline forgetting as reported in Anderson and Green 
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(2001) and Depue et al. (2006; 2007).  However, it is consistent with two previous studies 
completed in the same lab as the present dissertation project that also failed to find a 
significant memory suppression effect (Dykstra, 2010; Nair, 2008).   
Hypothesis 2 
ERP data was expected to conform to standard topography, with only experiment-
related variation.  ERP data was prepared and then analyzed for ERP-related hypotheses 
reviewed below.  
Overview of Standard Visual ERPs 
As we expected, the ERP waveforms observed in response to visual presentation 
of face cues conformed to standard waveform topography.  The typical visual perception 
waveform, as described by Luck (2005), is observed across a variety of tasks and is 
composed of a sequence of positive (P) and negative (N) components that appear in a 
predictable order: C1, P1, N1, P2, N2, P3 (sometimes called the P300), and others, such 
as the N400.  C1, the first deflection (i.e., large change in amplitude), occurs at 
approximately 50 ms post-stimulus presentation, may be either positive or negative 
depending on the location of the visual object, and is most pronounced at occipital and 
parietal sites (see Figure 1 for negative C1s at P3 and P4 sites).  Following C1 is a 
succession of peaks in the 100-300 ms range that reflect sensory responses to visual 
stimuli, often termed exogenous components for this reason and referred to as visual 
evoked potentials (Luck, 2005).  The waveforms presented in Figure 1 depict typical ERP 
patterns for a visual task and the peaks P1, N1, P2, N2, and P3 are visible on the posterior 
waveform.  Frontocentral ERP waveforms presented in Figure 2, however, show an 
expected variation in component sequence in that only N1, P2, N2, and P3 are visible 
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(see ―100–200 ms period . . .‖ for explanation).  The early P1–N2 components are 
reliably linked to a number of aspects of attention and cognitive control processing 
(Luck, Woodman, & Vogel, 2000).  Following N2, the P3 component with an onset 
around 300 ms at anterior and posterior sites is generally considered the first endogenous 
component in that it represents internally generated cognitive activity linked to 
categorization processes (Luck, 2005).  Following the P3, several prolonged effects can 
be identified.  Bergstrom et al. (2007) identified a late, left-sided positivity from ~500-
800 ms known as the Explicit Memory effect or Late Positive Component that has been 
linked to successful conscious recollection.  Similarly, Schupp et al. (2000) describe a 
Late Parietal Positivity (LPP), which is related to affective categorization tasks and 
maximal over right or central parietal areas. 
ERP Data Preparation 
Using the same basic procedure as other similar studies (e.g., Bergstrom et al., 
2007; Dykstra, 2010; Nair, 2008), electrophysiological recordings were reviewed, 
filtered, segmented and averaged for each participant, producing a waveform for each 
electrode for each experimental condition of the 2 Strategy x 2 Valence design (see 
Method for more detail).  Previous research identified four electrodes as indicators of 
lateralized (left and right, respectively) frontal activity (F3 & F4) and parietal activity (P3 
& P4).  See Figure 12 for diagram of electrode locations.  In a departure from previous 
studies, the decision was made to use frontocentral electrodes FC3 and FC4 in place of 
F3 and F4.  This was determined as the best method of addressing significant 
perspiration-related electrode artifact occurring at F3 and F4 for a small number of 
participants.  The F# and FC# electrodes are spatially quite proximal (~ 1 inch more 
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posterior), and this change in electrode site is not expected to produce any change in the 
resulting ERP data.  
Using a standard procedure for identifying ERP topography (Luck, 2005), grand 
average waveforms were visually reviewed for each condition to identify the onset and 
offset of alternating peaks and troughs representing separate neural ERP components.  
Data generated from ERP waveforms is an area measure representing the space between 
the curve and the origin within the time window specified.  No attempt was made to 
balance variation in component latency between anterior and posterior window sites.  
Area-under-the-curve values were computed separately for each experimental condition 
(i.e., 2 Strategy x 2 Valence) at each window (anterior vs. posterior) for two electrode 
sites (left vs. right of midline).  Anterior windows used FC3 and FC4 and posterior sites 
used P3 and P4.  Previous research identified F3/F4 and P3/P4 as desirable choices due to 
their position directly over frontal and parietal sites, respectively, regions of interest in 
this paradigm (Bergstrom et al., 2009; Dykstra, 2010; Nair, 2008).  In place of F3/F4, this 
study opted to use the electrodes in the row immediately behind, FC3/FC4, because of 
notably cleaner recordings and the low likelihood of differential effects between these 
adjacent electrodes.  Analyses entered ERP area-under-the-curve values at each window 
in a 2 Strategy x 2 Valence x 2 Laterality repeated-measures ANOVA.  Scores were used 
from either the 2 anterior (FC3 & FC4) or 2 posterior (P3 & P4) electrodes.  
Hypotheses 
At exogenous components (i.e., P1, N1, P2, N2), I expected activity at each 
component to follow a basic pattern where early activity was primarily related to visual 
processing of stimulus features while later activity demonstrated automatic task- and 
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emotion-related aspects of the stimuli.  Finally, endogenous late components should 
demonstrate conscious integration of task aspects consistent with successful performance 
of the T/NT task.  In addition, I expected to replicate the finding by Nair (2008) that 
posterior activity at the earliest components, P1 and N1, was associated with control 
processes involved in retrieval versus inhibited retrieval strategies on the T/NT task and 
the differential emotional valence of the target pictures (i.e., negative vs. neutral).While 
P1 and N1 are primarily concerned with processing attributes of visual stimuli, P2 and 
N2 components should be modulated at both the frontal and posterior sites, consistent 
with control processes associated with attention and the onset of memory retrieval 
(Anderson et al., 2004; Depue et al., 2007; Nair, 2008).  Based on previous results 
reported by Nair (2008), I expected to find evidence for the involvement of emotion- and 
retrieval-strategy-based neural networks that can operate independently in some time 
windows (i.e., main effects of strategy and/or valence in the absence of interaction).  As 
these inputs were integrated through cognitive processes, I expected a later emergence of 
interactive Strategy x Valence effects.  Finally, I expected to find a long duration parietal 
laterality effect that represents successful recall (Bergstrom et al., 2007; Schupp e al., 
2000).  
P1 and N1 Peaks: 100–200 ms Period Peaks at Posterior Electrodes   
Waveform patterns at P1.  Early ERP components indicated successful processing 
of the visual features of the face-cue stimuli.  As can be seen in Figure 3, there are P1 and 
N1 positive and negative peaks, respectively, in the 100-200 ms time window at P3/P4 
(left/right parietal sites; see Figure 12 for a diagram of electrode site placement).  There 
are also anterior P1 and N1 deflections barely discernable on Figure 2.  The anterior P1 is 
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actually negative-going and represents only the negative pole of visual responses present 
in posterior occipital areas, reflecting the fact that frontal control of posterior visual 
processing does not appear until later in the time-course of perceptual processing.  
Consequently, it is only a small amplitude shift that overlaps significantly with the 
subsequent N1 component, which is also very small in amplitude.  The small size and 
overlapping nature of these components rendered them inaccessible to analysis. 
Posterior P1 (125–164 ms).  A 2 Strategy x 2 Valence x 2 Laterality ANOVA was 
used to analyze the posterior P1 ERP areas in the 125-164 ms time window (see Table 4).  
There was a significant Strategy x Valence interaction, F(1, 34) =6.08, p = .019, ηp2 = 
.15, in which the P1 amplitude is greater for negative (M = 149.26, SEM = 17.87) than 
for neutral images (M = 135.31, SEM = 18.32) on think trials but greater for neutral (M = 
145.39, SEM = 16.73) than negative items (M = 128.40, SEM = 18.11) on the no-think 
trials (see Figure 13).  There is also a significant Strategy x Valence x Laterality 
interaction, F(1, 34) = 8.57, p = .006, ηp2 = .20, where the previously described Strategy 
x Valence interaction is stronger at the left (P3) than the right (P4) parietal sites.  This 
pattern suggests automatic processing of stimulus characteristics that appears to favor 
neutral stimuli over negative stimuli when encoding no-think stimuli but, when encoding 
think stimuli, appears to favor neutral over negative stimuli.   
Posterior N1 (165–204 ms).  The same ANOVA was conducted for the N1 
negative peaks in the 165-204 ms time window (see Table 4).  There was a significant 
main effect for strategy, F(1, 34) = 7.74, p = .009, ηp2 = .19, with think trials (M = 
107.79, SEM = 21.06) yielding a more negative N1 peak than no-think trials (M = 
124.56, SEM = 20.97).  Luck (2005) indicates that the N1 is an exogenous component 
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that varies based on attributes of the stimuli being perceived and can respond greater in 
occipital areas to discrimination tasks.  This suggests that even at 165 ms, participants 
were already correctly allocating more attentional resources to think stimuli than no-think 
stimuli. 
 P2 and N2 Peaks: 175-325 ms Period at Anterior and Posterior (P3 & P4) Sites   
Anterior P2 (170–249 ms).  Later exogenous components exhibited activity 
related to cognitive processing of the T/NT stimuli (see Table 4).  Because of the higher 
resolution and more defined topography at posterior sites, the anterior P2 ERP peak starts 
sooner at the frontal (FC3 & FC4) sites.  The overall time period of the anterior P2 and 
N2 analyses overlap by 30 ms with the preceding N1.  The P2 component, an attention-
modulated measure of higher-order perceptual processing, is usually maximal over 
frontal regions.  Areas of the P2 peak at the frontal (FC3 & FC4) sites were submitted to 
a 2 Strategy x 2 Valence x 2 Laterality ANOVA for the 170-249 ms time window.  The 
analysis yielded only a significant main effect for strategy, F(1, 34) = 4.40, p = .043, ηp2 
= .12, where the mean P2 component was larger for think (M = 143.47, SEM = 31.77) 
than for no-think trials (M = 125.16, SEM = 32.04).   
Posterior P2 (205–254 ms).  A similar ANOVA was conducted for areas under the 
P2 peak at the posterior (P3 & P4) sites in the 205-254 ms time window (see Table 4).  
There were no significant effects in the analysis of areas for the P2 waveform at the 
posterior electrode sites.  According to Luck (2005), the P2 component is a primarily 
frontal component that is sometimes larger for target stimuli when the stimuli are easily 
distinguishable or infrequent, which represents the influence of attention on higher-order 
perceptual processing.  Thus, the main effect for strategy at frontal sites suggests that the 
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colored border identifying think and no-think items was likely prominent during this 
period and appears sufficient for rapid discrimination between conditions.   
Anterior N2 (250–324 ms).  Areas for the N2 at the frontal (FC3 & FC4) 
electrode sites in the 250-324 ms time window yielded a different pattern than posterior 
sites (see Table 4).  Anterior electrodes produced only a significant Valence x Strategy 
interaction, F(1, 34) = 4.54, p = .040, ηp2 = .12, for which the negative condition 
produced an inhibition effect where no-think trials (M = -8.89, SEM = 33.47) had a more 
negative-going peak than think trials (M = 21.72, SEM = 33.01).  See Figure 14.  
However, for neutral stimuli, the pattern was reversed such that no-think stimuli (M = 
14.94, SEM = 34.87) showed only a small deflection while the think/neutral (M = -11.69, 
SEM = 35.75) showed a large, unexpected negative deflection.   
Posterior N2 (255–324 ms).  For posterior windows, a main effect emerged for 
strategy and a significant interaction was identified for Strategy x Valence (see Table 4).  
A review of these means indicated that think items (M = 192.53, SEM = 30.35) produced 
significantly lower negative deflection than no-think items (M = 240.57, SEM = 27.85), 
F(1, 34) = 13.67, p = .001, ηp2 = .29.  In the interaction, this negative deflection for 
strategy was larger for neutral items, think (M = 176.58, SD =32.68) > no-think (M = 
254.18, SD = 31.77) than for negative items, think (M = 208.47, SD = 30.26) > no-think 
(M = 226.95, SD = 26.71), F(1, 34) = 4.43, p = .043, ηp2 = .12;  see Figure 15).  These 
results are consistent with two subcomponents of the N2 described by Luck (2005) that 
have been linked specifically with go/no-go behavioral tasks, a similar experimental 
paradigm to the T/NT task that has participants respond behaviorally instead of 
cognitively.  Thus, the N2 represents a transitory component from exogenous or evoked 
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potentials to endogenous components that are related to cognitive control processes, in 
this case responsible for inhibition.  These results are congruent with a characteristic 
caudality effect for N2 components where anterior regions are involved primarily in 
inhibition (termed N2b component) and posterior regions respond more to visual 
discrimination of target stimuli (the N2c component).  Thus, the emergence of valence 
effects in both N2 peaks suggest that cognitive control processes related to emotional 
content have already been invoked.  Notably, the presence of the posterior N2c 
component is often linked with the appearance of a significant P3 component across the 
entire scalp.   
P3 Peaks: 300-600 ms Period 
Anterior P3 (325–449).  Data from the P3 components indicated evidence for 
significant activity related to conscious control processes (see Table 4).  Anterior ERP 
activity from 325-449 milliseconds showed a positive component that peaked between 
350–400 ms and resulted in significant main effects for strategy and laterality, but no 
significant interactions.  The patterns of marginal means indicated that think items (M = 
284.39, SEM = 66.59) generated a larger positive deflection than no-think items (M = 
219.77, SEM = 61.88), F(1, 34) = 6.04, p = .019, ηp2 = .15.  Similarly, FC4 (M = 268.13, 
SEM = 64.86) produced a larger P3 than FC3 (M = 236.04, SEM = 62.88), F(1, 34) = 
11.46, p = .002, ηp2 = .25.   
Posterior early P3 (325–389 ms).  At posterior sites, a P3 waveform was 
identified with two peaks, the first occurring between 325–374 ms and the second 
occurring between 400–449 ms (see Table 4).  Visual inspection of the waveforms 
suggested that qualitatively different patterns of brain activity were occurring in the two 
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peaks, so analyses addressed them separately.  The results for the first posterior P3 peak 
produced significant main effects for valence and laterality, and a nonsignificant trend 
towards a three-way interaction between Strategy x Valence x  Laterality (p = .051).  The 
main effects for valence and laterality showed a greater positive deflection for negative 
items (M = 299.13, SEM = 30.73) than neutral items (M = 273.67 , SEM = 31.37), F(1, 
34) = 5.29, p = .028, ηp2 = .14, and the emergence of a trend for greater positive 
deflection in the right-sided electrodes FC4 & P4 (M = 305.54, SEM = 32.42), than the 
left-sided electrodes FC3 & P3 (M = 267.26, SEM = 30.06), F(1, 34) = 8.40, p = .007, 
ηp2 = .20.  A review of the means suggest that valence differences in the no-think 
condition showed a contrasting pattern at P4 (negative < neutral) when compared to P3 
(negative > neutral). 
Posterior main P3 (390–474 ms).  The results for the second posterior peak also 
produced significant main effects for strategy and laterality, but no interactions (see 
Table 4).  The effect of strategy showed greater positive deflection for think items (M = 
418.13, SEM = 43.24) than no-think items (M = 353.04, SEM = 37.99), F(1, 34) = 7.39, 
p = .010, ηp2 = .18.  The laterality effect was a continuation of the pattern for right-sided 
parietal electrodes (M = 418.38, SEM = 43.89) to produce a larger positive peak than 
left-sided electrodes (M = 352.78, SEM = 36.03), F(1, 34) = 10.86, p = .002, ηp2 = .24.   
The main effects for strategy, valence, and laterality appearing in frontal and/or 
parietal sites are congruent with information on the P3 provided by Luck (2005) that it 
tends to be larger on more complex tasks, especially when participants are expected to 
attend to and evaluate stimuli or when affective stimuli are manipulated by the 
participant.  The P3 is considered the first fully endogenous ERP component in that it is 
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the first component that is a measure of internally generated rather than externally evoked 
phenomena.  As a result, the effects of strategy and valence suggest the appearance of 
brain activity directly related to the use of cognitive control on memory processes.  
Furthermore, the laterality effect is likely an early expression of a long-enduring, effortful 
component termed the late parietal positivity (LPP; Schupp et al., 2000), which appears 
on tasks that involve memorizing and recalling of correct responses. 
Late ERP Effects 
Anterior late ERP activity (450–824 ms).  Late components revealed significant 
activity related to participant performance on the T/NT task (see Table 4).  To further 
investigate the emergence of strategy, valence, and late positivity effects, analyses were 
completed on ERP data from 450–824 ms at anterior sites and 475-849 ms at posterior 
sites.  Both anterior and posterior windows produced significant Strategy x Valence x 
Laterality interactions.  Anterior sites also produced a main effect for laterality in which 
the right-sided FC4 electrode (M = 854.66, SEM = 166.79) showed significantly greater 
ERP positivity than the left-sided FC3 electrode (M = 666.45, SEM = 163.29), F(1, 34) = 
6.39, p = .016, ηp2 = .16.  The 3-way interaction produced a pattern where the effect of 
strategy on negative items (think > no-think) was greater than on neutral items, and this 
pattern was more pronounced at FC4 than at FC3, F(1, 34) = 4.98, p = .032, ηp2 = .13; 
see Figure 16).  
Posterior late ERP activity (475–849).  Posterior sites produced a large main 
effect for strategy where think items (M = 1148.11, SEM = 139.44) produced a larger 
ERP response than no-think items (M = 728.10, SEM = 143.63), F(1, 34) = 20.38, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .38 (see Table 4).  The significant 3-way interaction demonstrated a 
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contrasting effect of valence on strategy at the P4 electrode where negative items showed 
a greater strategy effect (think > no-think) when compared to P3 electrode where neutral 
items showed a larger strategy difference (think > no-think), F(1, 34) = 5.71, p = .023, 
ηp2 = .14; see Figure 17). 
Together, these late windows provide strong evidence for the presence of a late 
potential representing a large P3 response to the cognitive task of selectively recalling or 
inhibiting recall of recently formed memory traces.  Frontal sites in the late window show 
a significant amplitude difference favoring the right side, and anterior sites demonstrate a 
large strategy difference generated on the right side that was maintained for the duration 
of the window (see Figures 2 & 3).  
Hypothesis 3 
To identify important relationships between ERP activity, cognitive performance, 
and psychometric variables, correlation analyses were performed on recall scores and 
ERP variables from periods of interest (see Table 4).  Cued recall test performance 
following the T/NT task and ERP data were anticipated to relate significantly with 
psychometric and cognitive variables theoretical or empirically related to cognitive 
control, including measures of mindfulness, control over ruminative thoughts, attention, 
working memory capacity, and depression/stress.  From previous research by Nair 
(2008), ERP activity at parietal sites during P1 and N1 were expected to relate 
significantly with measures of cognitive control.  Similarly, Nair (2008) identified the N2 
components appearing late in the 200–300 ms window as important in the expression of 
emotional control processes.  Consequently, significant correlations were anticipated for 
ERP effect variables generated for these windows. 
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Percent Recall Correlations 
Relationships with memory recall were examined first.  Recall scores were 
computed to represent total recall percent and general strategy and valence effects for 
each participant.  This was done by taking mean percent-correct recall scores for all think 
trials for each individual and subtracting the mean percent-correct recall on all no-think 
trials for each individual to generate the strategy effect variable.  Similarly, mean percent 
correct scores for all neutral items for each individual were subtracted from mean recall 
scores for all negative items for each individual to generate the valence effect variable.  
These variables were then entered with mean percent-correct recall scores for each 
condition of the 2 Strategy x 2 Valence design into a correlational analysis assessing their 
relatedness to mindfulness measures (MAAS and FFMQ), control of intrusive thought 
measures (RRS and WBSI), attention/working memory measures (SSPAN and ANT), 
and clinically relevant measures (BDI and PSS).  Results are reported in Table 5.  Aside 
from a significant negative relationship between the strategy variable and the FFMQ-
Observe, r = -.38, p = .023, r
2
 = .15, that indicated an inverse relationship between recall 
and paying attention to one’s perceptions, thoughts, and feelings (perhaps identifying a 
trait related to internal distraction), a significant pattern of direct relationships emerged 
between two of the condition-related recall scores.  Overall performance on a measure of 
working memory span was significantly related to recall performance on both negative 
but neither neutral recall conditions: Think/Negative, r = .40, p = .018, r
2
 = .16, and No-
Think/Negative, r = .48, p = .004, r
2
 = .23.  These relationships suggest that better 
performance at working memory is related to better recall of negative items, regardless of 
strategy condition. 
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Preparation of ERP Variables.   
To investigate the hypothesized relationships between cognitive-control-related 
ERP activity and psychometric and cognitive measures, summary ERP variables were 
computed for early posterior components, P1 and N1, and for both anterior and posterior 
N2 components previously identified by Nair (2008).  No laterality effects were 
considered so all variables were averaged across laterality.  The variables were: a) a mean 
ERP score across all four 2 Strategy x 2 Valence conditions; b) an ERP strategy score 
which averaged think trials and subtracted the average of no-think trials; and c) an ERP 
valence scores that averaged all negative condition scores and subtracted neutral 
condition scores.  These variables were entered into a correlation analysis with the other 
measures of interest listed above.  Results are reported in Table 6.  
Correlations for Posterior P1 
Results for the three ERP variables at posterior P1 produced only two significant 
correlations.  The strategy ERP variable was negatively correlated with the FFMQ-
Nonjudging subscale, r = -.35, p = .039, r
2
 = .12, and positively correlated with the RRS-
Total score, r = .35, p = .044, r
2
 = .12.  This strategy-related activity occurring at the 
earliest time window analyzed suggest that traits related to increased self-judgment and 
higher rumination are positively related to higher ERP/brain activity in the think over the 
no-think difference. 
Correlations for Posterior N1 
Results for the three ERP variables at the posterior visual N1 component 
produced a significant direct correlation between the ERP strategy variable and the 
FFMQ-Observe, r = .41, p = .016, r
2
 = .17.  This relationship suggests that as a 
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participant endorsed higher levels of attending to their sensations, perceptions, thoughts, 
and feelings, they produced a less negative shift (or weaker response) in ERP activity on 
think items when compared to no-think items.  
Correlations for Posterior N2 
Results for the three ERP variables at the posterior N2, a component chosen a 
priori as a window of particular interest, identified two significant relationships with the 
valence ERP variable: a negative correlation with the BDI-SF, r = .53, p = .001, r
2
 = .28, 
and a positive correlation with the FFMQ-Describe, r = .35, p = .041, r
2
 = .12.  These are 
the first relationships identified with valence effects.  The first correlation suggests that 
higher scores on a measure of depressive symptomatology are related to a significantly 
more negative difference for ERP activity on negative trials subtracting out neutral 
activity.  Conversely, the relationship with the FFMQ-Describe, a measure of a 
participant’s tendency to label/categorize their experiences, suggests that as their 
Describe scores increase, they produce a significantly smaller negative difference for 
ERP activity in negative trials minus neutral trials. 
Correlations for Anterior N2 
Results for the three ERP variables at the anterior N2 indicate a number of 
significant effects.  Mirroring activity in posterior areas, FFMQ-Describe produced a 
significant positive relationship with the ERP valence variable, r = .48, p = .004, r
2
 = .23.  
The presence of the same effect at anterior sites as posterior sites suggests a widespread 
valence-related control mechanism active at N2.  Notably, the Total ERP activity variable 
resulted in a five significant relationships with measures related to effective cognitive 
control: the FFMQ-Aware, the WBSI, the MAAS mean score, SSPAN Total score, and 
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the ANT Conflict network.  The significant negative correlation with the FFMQ-Aware, a 
measure of how well a participant acts with awareness in his or her day-to-day life, r = -
.40, p = .034, r
2 
= .16, and the MAAS, a dispositional mindfulness measure, r = -.38, p = 
.025, r
2
 = .14, suggest that as participants endorse higher levels of mental control, they 
produce significantly stronger negative ERP effects at N2.  Similarly, a significant 
negative relationship emerged with an actual performance-related variable measuring 
working memory span, the SSPAN Total score, r = -.46, p = .006, r
2
 = .21.  The final two 
significant relationships were with the WBSI, a measure of failures at controlling 
negative intrusive thoughts, r = .34, p = .048, r
2
 = .11, and with the ANT Conflict 
network, a performance-based assessment of an attention network related to executive 
function (where higher scores = worse performance), r = .39, p = .022, r
2
 = .15.  These 
relationships suggest that as scores on the measures increase, representing poorer 
cognitive control, ERP activity related to general recall memory also shows significantly 
weaker negative-going amplitudes.  Together, the significant congruent correlations of 
these five variables theoretically and empirically related to cognitive control demonstrate 
strong evidence for the action of cognitive control processes at anterior N2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Review and Rationale 
The effective use of cognitive control on mental processes is a crucial skill needed 
in day-to-day life.  The ability to selectively promote or inhibit specific cognitive events 
is required for normal function, and deficits in cognitive control can often lead to 
negative outcomes, from depression to absentmindedness.  Mounting evidence suggests 
that control of cognitive events, including memories, uses the same neural network as 
control of behavioral responses (Anderson  et al., 2004), leading some researchers to 
propose a unitary cognitive control network active across multiple domains (Anderson & 
Green, 2001).  According to other researchers, this network likely functions using two 
processes (Gopher, 1996; Wegner et al., 1987), a rapid, automatic control process 
followed by a slower, effortful process that is able to counteract or sustain the first.  
Because it is effortful, it may respond poorly to a number of internal and external 
conditions, including individual difference in the functioning of executive control (Levy 
& Anderson, 2008) or fatigue from extended or intense usage (Muraven et al., 1998).  
One researcher has noted the presence of automatic patterns in cognitive control of 
memory that may underlie mood-congruent biases (e.g., the MCMB), which were also 
counteracted by invoking conscious, effortful processes (Hertel & Mahan, 2008).  
Another has suggested that rumination functions by automatically flagging a negative 
thought and then failing to reduce the thought using an effortful process (Wegner et al., 
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1987).  Thus, this group of studies provides evidence for what appears to be a single, 
generic, two-component cognitive process for exerting control over multiple domains that 
is subject to failure, and such failures can lead to severe consequences. 
One primary reflection of cognitive control performance is attention, as control 
processes are largely responsible for the effective directing of attention.  While memory 
is known to be managed by cognitive control, the exact method is still unknown.  Cowan 
(1999) and Engle (Reddick & Engle, 2006) have suggested a mechanism for cognitive 
control of memory through working memory.  They proposed that working memory is 
the temporary direction of attention on long-term memory traces.  If true, the cognitive 
control of attention and memory would be closely associated.  However, this process is 
complicated by the inclusion of emotion.  Recent research has suggested that emotional 
inputs function relatively separately from early cognitive control but can influence 
control processes.  Depue et al. (2007) and Nair (2008) found evidence to support this 
early component, using the T/NT, ERP, photo images for stimuli, and negative and 
neutrally valenced stimuli to elicit emotion-related effects on cognitive control.  
The study by Nair (2008), completed in the same lab as this dissertation and 
modeled on research by Depue et al. (2006) studied the effects of emotion on cognitive 
control using the T/NT task.  This innovative cognitive task, related to the go/no-go task, 
renders accessible processes of selective facilitation or inhibition that are not available 
from more traditional tests of memory.  Nair related ERP recordings during completion 
of the T/NT task to a measure of depressive rumination, a hypothesized sign of a 
breakdown in cognitive control.  Nair’s results supported her hypothesis that rumination 
was related to emotion control processes found to be at work in a 200-300 ms window 
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post-stimulus.  Furthermore, she found early activity at P1 and N1 in posterior areas that 
was connected to better performance on the T/NT task and activity after 500 ms related to 
successful recall of memory.  Building off this study, a pilot study was conducted by the 
author.  Seeking to link cognitive control on the T/NT task with several variables related 
to successful or failed control (e.g., mindfulness, intrusive thoughts, rumination), the 
results indicated that low scores on a measure of dispositional mindfulness were able to 
identify participants that showed a deficit in the cognitive control of negative memories. 
As a result, the current study sought to extend these findings by adding ERP collection 
and analysis to the design in the hope of providing stronger evidence for the role of 
mindfulness and other variables in the cognitive control of emotional memories. 
Summary of Main Results 
The current study was designed to elicit and assess cognitive control of emotional 
memories on a cued recall task.  Secondarily, it sought to identify neural activity recorded 
during completion of the T/NT task.  Thirdly, it sought to associate neural activity and 
memory recall with clinical and cognitive measures hypothesized to influence or express 
cognitive control.  Using this process, it was hoped that this study would provide new 
information about individual differences in cognitive control of emotional memory.  As 
predicted, recall scores were greater for neutral vs. negative items and for items in the 
think vs. no-think condition that emphasized conscious facilitation of a memory trace.  
Unlike previous studies in other labs (Bergstrom et al., 2007; Depue et al., 2007) but 
consistent with a previous study in this lab (Nair, 2008), no interaction was found.  
However, given its low power (.39) to find a small effect (ηp
2
 = .08), a larger N study 
may find the current pattern rise to the level of statistical significance, where strategy 
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effects were greater in the neutral condition than the negative condition, as was found in 
the pilot study (Eyer, 2009). 
Secondary analyses reviewed neural ERP recordings taken during the T/NT task 
for evidence of emotion-related cognitive control processes.  Several ERP findings were 
especially noteworthy.  At the posterior P1 component occurring at only 125-164 ms, 
significant variability in ERP activity was seen related to integrated stimulus 
characteristics that were both visible (i.e., strategy effects represented by colored borders) 
and associated (i.e., valence effects resulting from previous pairings with negative and 
neutral images) and appeared stronger on the left side.  In addition, integrated valence 
effects did re-emerge at both anterior and posterior sites in the N2 component at 250–325 
ms, although no stand-alone main effects for valence were identified in early 
components.  Strategy-related effects were observed very early in the waveforms and 
continued until 800 ms.  A late ERP component, starting at 300 ms in both anterior and 
posterior sites, represented a second period related to conscious cognitive control.  
Laterality effects also emerged around 300 ms indicating the presence of late parietal 
positivity (LPP) that was maximal over posterior sites and lateralized in this study to the 
right-side.  It also included a significant, prolonged Strategy x Valence x Laterality 
interaction.  Together, these effects suggest two distinct periods of cognitive control, one 
rapid and relatively automatic around 200 ms and one more effortful and enduring 
occurring around 300 ms, with both featuring integrated valence and strategy 
information.  
Tertiary analyses explored general, strategy-, and valence-related ERP activity 
with psychometric and cognitive measures.  A sequence of findings emerged at very early 
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components, mostly associated with sensory perception, which show evidence of 
relationships to working memory and executive function.  A significant pattern of 
relationships emerged at N2 strongly suggesting that the period from 200–300 ms, 
identified a priori as important, represents a period of active automatic cognitive control.  
Activity at posterior sites during this period, usually related to accurate recall of target 
stimuli, was associated in opposite directions with depressive rumination and a 
mindfulness-related trait.  Furthermore, activity at anterior sites during N2, usually 
associated with inhibiting responses, was broadly correlated with measures that reflect 
individual differences in cognitive control, including self-reported mindfulness, working 
memory, failures at managing intrusive thoughts, and attention-related executive 
functioning.  These correlations provide strong evidence that ERP activity at P1, N1, and 
P2/N2 represents the electrical signature of cognitive control processes. 
Interpretation  
The results of the current study provide intriguing information to elucidate the 
influences of emotion and attention on the cognitive control of memory.  The study 
produced three significant findings: (a) evidence for a remarkably early stimulus response 
that carries information about valence and strategy at posterior P1; (b) timing evidence 
for the neural networks proposed in Depue et al. (2007) and Anderson et al. (2004); and 
(c) significant links between general brain activity at N2 and a number of cognitive 
control-related variables.   
The first finding for an integrated cognitive response to stimuli at P1 is notable as 
this period is generally considered to only represent the parsing and recombination of 
visual stimuli.  This effect suggests either the presence of a novel, nearly instantaneous 
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endogenous influence on P1 or the pairing of the emotional content of the target stimulus 
directly onto the cue image.  It is important to note that the cue images presented to the 
participants did not have any inherent emotional attributes.  Rather, the valence effects 
are a result of memorized emotional content that was immediately accessed upon 
stimulus presentation before conscious awareness.  Whether endogenous or paired, the 
emergence of an effect at this early period would seem to diverge from widely accepted 
views of early visual processing as one of stimulus attributes alone.  Early valence effects 
were also found by Nair (2008), but no other evidence of such an early effect was found 
outside this lab.  If validated, this effect suggests early perceptual processes may be 
capable of eliciting or recognizing more complex stimulus characteristics than previously 
thought. 
The second primary finding in this study was the identification of periods of 
cognitive control that appear related to the neural networks proposed by Depue et al. 
(2007) and Anderson et al. (2004).  Depue et al. proposed two networks, one occurring 
when first attempting to exert cognitive control on memories and another when that 
control begins working and memory retrieval is avoided.  Consequently, these two 
networks may well overlap in their timing.  Nevertheless, the emergence of a significant 
main effect for brain activity at P2 to be related to the strategy condition, followed 
immediately by the emergence of Strategy x Valence interactions at N2 provides 
reasonable overlap with the prefrontal connections that lead to greater frontal strategy 
effects, and according to Depue et al., integrated with valence effects proceeding from the 
amygdala.  Thus, it appears likely, at least, that the neural networks identified by Depue 
and Anderson and colleagues commence their primary activity at N2. 
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The third primary finding of this study is the compelling group of cognitive 
control variables correlated to general brain activity at the anterior N2.  General brain 
activity was not related to any measure at any other time window examined.  This 
provides strong evidence to suggest the primary activity represented at N2 is the action of 
cognitive control processes.  Furthermore, the nature of the relationships (negative 
correlations with MAAS, FFMQ-Awareness, and working memory SSPAN Total, and 
positive correlations with WBSI and the Conflict subscale of the ANT) suggest that 
greater magnitude effects at N2 (negative-going) are related to better cognitive control.  
Implications & Conclusions 
These findings suggest that cognitive control processes linked to memory begin in 
earnest at anterior N2, approximately ~250 ms after stimulus onset, and appear to 
represent neural activity identified by others.  Frontal sites are implicated strongly in 
fMRI research by Depue et al. (2007) and Anderson et al. (2004), including prefrontal 
cortex, dorsolateral and mediallateral prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex. 
These structures have been implicated in a number of paradigms invoking cognitive 
control and attention, for example linking the anterior cingulate to conflict-
monitoring/resolving control processes (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 
1999).  Similarly, Lang and colleagues have proposed a ―motivated attention‖ model of 
emotional perception occurring at N2 that represents the influence of control-modulated 
motivational inputs on attention and which are linked to the parallel activation of areas in 
the inferotemporal visual cortex and the amygdala (Sabatinelli, Bradley, Fitzsimmons, & 
Lang, 2005).  Thus, this study provides some assistance by establishing the likely 
temporal distribution of the neural networks confirmed in these studies. 
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Similarly, correlational measures and other data indicate that working memory 
and attention are intimately intertwined, particularly soon after stimulus presentation.  
These data support the embedded-processes model proposed by Cowan (1999) that 
working memory is the product of cognitive control of attention focused on long-term 
memory stores.  In the current study, attention and working memory span measures 
presented in Table 3 were highly correlated, and early brain activity associated with 
cognitive control of remembered items was also related to working memory span.  Thus, 
it seems likely that working memory features a close relationship with attention that well 
may be best described by the theory proposed by Cowan and elaborated by Engle. 
These results also seem to support several models proposing a two-component 
process of control, one automatic and fast and another slow and effortful, such as ironic 
process theory outlined by Wegner and colleagues.  We identified an early automatic 
cognitive control component located during N2 around 275 ms post-stimulus, and a later 
long-enduring change in ERP topography that was related to effortful control of memory 
on the T/NT task.  Notably, these early components showed relationships with variables 
such as depressive rumination, mindfulness, and Wegner’s WBSI.  These relationships 
provide further support for the rapid, automatic signaling process proposed by Wegner 
and followed by a long, effortful control process.  However, the indirect association of 
these patterns of early activity with ultimate recall suggests that individual variation in 
executive function may provide important variability in the effectiveness of these 
networks, as was proposed in the executive-deficit hypothesis by Anderson and 
colleagues.  Indeed, despite the presence of early automatic processes, there was a large 
range in recall scores, suggesting that both automatic and effortful control processes 
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demonstrate variability between persons, as posited by Anderson, and within persons, as 
suggested by Baumeister and colleagues.  Given this pattern of control, the variation in 
expression of the mood-congruent memory bias makes more sense.  When effortful 
conscious cognitive control is exerted on negative memories, as described by Hertel, even 
depressed participants are able to intentionally forget them.  However, when effortful 
control is not invoked, Hertel found evidence to support a mood-congruent effect for 
greater negative recall.  It may be that this earlier automatic process up-regulates mood-
congruent negative material in those with depressive symptoms, producing a bias for 
negative material that a person may not consciously recognize because it uses 
mechanisms that operate immediately before conscious control steps in.  
However, evidence for separate emotion-related neural inputs posited by Nair 
(2008) given her finding for the presence of separate main effects for valence and 
strategy were not supported. Nair suggested the presence of two mechanisms at work to 
identify and inhibit certain stimuli and separately to process emotional aspects of the 
associated memory trace.  The current study only found interactions suggesting an 
integrated representation of valence and strategy aspects of the stimuli, consistent with 
the co-occurring changes in the hippocampus and amygdala reported by Depue et al. 
(2007).  Thus, differential emotion-related ERP effects at periods of pre-conscious 
processing implicate an automatic emotional input.  It is noteworthy—though congruent 
with common experience—that such influences occur before conscious control processes 
are able to influence them.  Consequently, these inputs likely exert initial influences 
beneath the level of conscious awareness.  
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Similarly noteworthy for clinical psychologists are the early relationships 
identified between emotion-related activity at early windows and the clinical variables of 
rumination, depression, and mindfulness.  As reported above, theories for a cognitive 
cause of depression go back to at least the early 60s (Beck, 1967), and one proposed 
mechanism is through ruminative thought (Miranda & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007).  Our 
finding that early anterior activity was related to depressive symptoms and mindfulness 
traits suggests the presence of a possible underlying trait that can result in depression if 
effortful control processes are not invoked.  One attractive candidate for such a process is 
mindfulness.  It should be noted that the measure of self-reported dispositional 
mindfulness emerged as significantly related with ERP activity prior to the onset of 
conscious or effortful cognitive-control processes.  This activity supports suggestions by 
proponents of the clinical use of mindfulness (e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 2003) that mindfulness 
may serve to prevent the expression or development of negative cognitive patterns.  
However, none of the students in this study regularly practiced mindfulness, so it is likely 
that these results represent untrained or base-level trait mindfulness.  Although some 
researchers are finding compelling physiological changes in brain activity after only brief 
mindfulness training (Zeidan et al., 2011), it remains to be seen if it can produce such 
early changes in neural responses. 
Given these relationships to theory, possibilities exist for future research.  If 
emotional memory does indeed occur before conscious processing of the image, a study 
involving a priming paradigm, where an image is displayed only long enough to be 
encoded visually but where the participant is immediately asked to complete another task, 
should produce a result where emotional inputs are activated but conscious awareness of 
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the emotional content is not activated.  Thus, mood effects may be triggered or 
transferred without the participant’s conscious awareness.  For example, if the priming 
paradigm pairs previously learned cue images for negative content consistently with an 
image of a neutral stimulus, subjective participant ratings for the neutral stimulus may 
become more negative without the participant being consciously aware of the new 
emotional link.  A subsequent sorting task may allow the researchers to indirectly assess 
the participant’s emotional connection to a stimulus. 
 Similarly, additional research into the emotional control of negative intrusive 
thoughts suggests some areas for additional research. For example, given the postulated 
two-component structure of ironic process theory, negative emotional content may be 
automatically triggered by any number of stimuli without a person’s conscious awareness 
of these links.  If a person begins to attempt effortful cognitive control to down-regulate 
negative emotional stimuli but has little idea which stimuli are triggering the emotion, 
errors in sourcing could produce patterns often seen in clinical conditions such as anxiety 
disorders. 
Study Weaknesses 
As described above, the current study produced a range of findings that offer 
strong support for some theories about cognitive control of emotional memory and more 
speculative evidence for others.  It was able to produce these results despite a number of 
weaknesses.  Most notably, significant participant loss to attrition was experienced.  The 
use of two separate testing sessions was implemented to reduce participant fatigue during 
the rather long primary testing session (~2.5 hrs).  Initially, participants were to sign up 
for the entire study and receive all credit upon completion.  However, the IRB requested 
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that intermediate credit be given for completion of Part 1.  As a result, many students 
obtained the credit they needed and opted not to complete the study, despite asserting 
their total participation before agreeing to participate.  Although methods of reducing this 
attrition were discussed, none were implemented to ensure continued congruence with 
IRB requests and protection of student participants.  Given the high number of variables 
and relationships explored across a range of ERP components, the current study also runs 
significant risk for a Type I Error.  Given the newness of this information and the limited 
power to find effects given the low N, it was decided to investigate relationships and 
effects without controlling for experimentwise error to help present information that 
could lead to future research.  However, the findings reported here need to be replicated 
before stronger statements can be made about their implications.  More confidence may 
be afforded to the patterns of effects that emerged with some consistency than to any 
individual effect or correlation.  Another weakness of the current study is the long 
duration of the second testing session.  One reason for this duration is the overtraining 
that was used to ensure high levels of initial memory for stimulus pairs.  However, the 
resulting recognition scores suggest that the use of a fourth training cycle may have 
induced participant fatigue that negatively affected recall.  Future studies using this 
paradigm should reduce this training time by at least one cycle.  In the same vein, 
although the T/NT task requires nearly two hours to complete with the current stimulus 
set, it is possible that all other assessments (i.e., RRS, MAAS, ANT, and SSPAN) could 
have been given at an initial session.  The decision was made to use the current design to 
avoid time-related variation in participant characteristics and performance between 
testing sessions.  Perhaps related to this, the current study fails to find expected 
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relationships between performance variables and clinical measures.  For example, 
relationships between MAAS and memory recall and between ERP variables and 
Brooding subscale of the RRS failed to emerge despite robust relationships seen in 
previous studies in the same lab.  Similarly, a number of secondary measures could have 
been cut from the current design, reducing its duration.   
In other areas, the design and results suggest some shortcomings as well.  Most 
notably, many studies using the T/NT fail to find the significant memory suppression 
effect as found by others (Anderson et al., 2004; Bergstrom et al., 2007; 2009; Depue et 
al., 2006; 2007).  One possible explanation for this deficit is the current task is longer 
with a somewhat different training process than other studies.  It is possible that our 
research suffers more from passive forgetting than others due to these factors.  
Consistently lower baseline recall scores in this study, Eyer (2009), Dykstra (2010), and 
Nair (2008) would support this supposition.  If baseline score were to rise, the chances of 
finding a memory suppression effect would increase.  On a smaller scale, ERP 
waveforms demonstrated a strong slope during the pre-stimulus period.  Investigation of 
this effect resulted in the identification of a prolonged LPP that endures for up to two 
seconds after a stimulus is presented, depending on the length of stimulus presentation.  
Although this EEG activity is unlikely to produce significant effects on ERP data, future 
studies should prolong and vary the length of the intertrial interval to reduce the risk of 
ERP contamination.  Finally, participant strategies for thought suppression on the T/NT 
task can vary widely.  If these patterns are unsystematic, then any related activity will be 
averaged out during processing.  However, as reported by Bergstrom et al. (2009) and 
found in our study, participant responses coalesce to two primary strategies: thought 
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substitution and simple suppression.  When thought substitution is chosen, ERP results 
mimic those of successfully recalled pairs.  Consequently, desired strategy-related 
differences are reduced, perhaps significantly.  To address this, Bergstrom et al. (2009) 
used a simple prompt ―You should accomplish this by trying to block thinking of the 
Response word, but not by replacing it with any other thoughts.  To repeat: do not think 
of anything else than the Hint word while you are blocking the response, just keep paying 
attention to, and looking at, the Hint word the entire time‖ (p. 729).  Future studies using 
this paradigm should include such a brief statement.  
Study Strengths & Conclusion 
Despite the weaknesses described above and its failure to replicate the pilot 
study’s effect for mindfulness, the current study exhibits a number of strengths.  Most 
notably, it conducted a broad-based investigation of cognitive-control-related variables 
for comparison with direct measures of brain activity.  ERPs were collected during 
performance of an innovative new paradigm, the T/NT task, which provides explicit 
measures of cognitive control success or failure, as well as behavioral recall scores.  In 
the interest of improving its translation to other branches of psychology, it also included 
two cognitive tasks on attention and working memory and a number of psychometric 
self-report measures to establish a context for the cognitive results.  The benefits of this 
approach include the use of direct measures of brain activity representing automatic 
emotion-related control process for association with widely used psychometric and 
clinical measures.  Accordingly, the results of this combined clinical/cognitive 
psychology study provide unique new material for scientists.  Most notably, it suggests 
the presence of an automatic cognitive processing component that occurs at stimulus 
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presentation and contains relatively complex information.  It also provides important 
temporal patterns for relating to neural networks generated by other studies.  Specifically, 
it appears that early activity in the prefrontal cortex leads to activation of multiple frontal 
areas and subsequent posterior and limbic system areas that are related to down-
regulation of sensory representations in memory and actual emotional memory as 
represented by hippocampus and amygdala activity.  Finally, it provides compelling 
evidence for the role of N2 in the onset of cognitive control processes.  To a lesser extent, 
the concurrent emergence of early emotion-related valence effects and significant 
relationships with measures of depression, rumination, and mindfulness provide cognitive 
psychologists with new data about an emotionally valenced attention-control process and 
clinical psychologists with new information about how mindfulness may function to 
reduce clinical disorders, such as anxiety.  Furthermore, this unique paradigm has 
allowed us to make connections with features inside Skinners ―black box.‖  That is, the 
use of the T/NT and ERP recordings allows noninvasive exploration of actual thought 
processes.  These insights have produced new evidence supporting Cowan’s embedded-
process theory and Gopher’s dual process model for executive function.  It validates 
Hertel’s contention that mood-congruent passive forgetting can be overcome by 
conscious effort and provides support for Anderson’s executive-deficit hypothesis, 
suggesting individual differences in cognitive control function.  As such, the current 
study provided new data outlining the sequencing and interaction of strategy and mood 
processes during the performance of a cued-recall cognitive task and advances the 
literature on the mechanisms underlying the cognitive control processes governing recall 
of emotional memories.  
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TABLE 1: 
 
Demographic and Descriptive Data for Participants 
Note. Total N = 35. ES = effect size, either φ or η
2
, as appropriate; & EHI-LQ = the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory–Laterality Quotient. 
a
 Age and EHI-LQ report means, standard deviations, F statistics. 
b 
Other and Mixed categories 
were dropped from table (ns = 0). 
C
 One female declined to give class information. 
 
 
  Male   Female   Statistics 
Variable N % 
 
N % 
 
df χ
2
 p ES 
         
 
 Gender 18 51.4 
 
17 48.6 
 
1 0.03 .866 – 
         
 
 Age
a
 24.2 (5.66) 
 
23.5 (6.78) 
 
34 0.13 .723 .00 
         
 
 Race
b
 – – 
 
– – 
 
3 4.69 .196 .37 
     White 11 31.4 
 
12 34.3 
 
– – – – 
     Black 2 5.7 
 
4 11.4 
 
– – – – 
     Latino/a 1 2.9 
 
1 2.9 
 
– – – – 
     Asian 4 11.4 
 
0 0.0 
 
– – – – 
         
 
 Class
c
 – – 
 
– – 
 
4 4.02 .404 .34 
     Freshman 8 23.5 
 
4 11.8 
 
– – – – 
     Sophomore 2 5.9 
 
5 14.7 
 
– – – – 
     Junior 5 14.7 
 
3 8.8 
 
– – – – 
     Senior 3 8.8 
 
3 8.8 
 
– – – – 
     Other 0 0.0 
 
1 2.9 
 
– – – – 
         
 
 
Handedness 
        
 
 
     Self-Report 18 100.0 
 
17 100.0 
 
– – – – 
     EHI-LQ 98.6 (5.89) 
 
100 (0.00) 
 
34 .94 .339 .03 
         
 
 
Native Speaker 18 100.0 
 
17 100.0 
 – – – – 
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TABLE 4: 
 
Significant repeated-measures ANOVA effects at each ERP component using area-under-
the-curve scores. 
 Window (ms) Effect Fb p ηp
2 
P1
a
       
   Posterior 125–164 Strategy x Valence,  
Strategy x Valence x Laterality 
6.08 
8.57 
.019 
.006 
.15 
.20 
N1
a
       
   Posterior 165–204 Strategy 7.74 .009 .19 
P2      
   Anterior 170–249 Strategy 4.40 .043 .12 
   Posterior 205–254 NS — — — 
N2      
   Anterior 250–324 Strategy x Valence 4.54 .040 .12 
   Posterior 255–324 Strategy  
Strategy x Valence  
13.67 
4.43 
.001 
.043 
.29 
.12 
Early P3
a
      
   Posterior 325–389 Valence 
Laterality 
5.29 
8.40 
.028 
.007 
.14 
.20 
P3      
   Anterior 325–449 Strategy  
Laterality  
6.04 
11.46 
.019 
.002 
.12 
.25 
   Posterior 390–474 Strategy 
Laterality 
7.39 
10.86 
.010 
.002 
.18 
.24 
Late ERPs      
   Anterior 450–824 Laterality  
Strategy x Valence x Laterality 
6.39 
4.98 
.016 
.032 
.16 
.13 
   Posterior 475–849 Strategy  
Strategy x Valence x Laterality 
20.38 
5.71 
.001 
.023 
.38 
.14 
Note.  N = 35.  NS = none significant.  Anterior indicates electrodes FC3 and FC4.  Posterior represents the activity at 
electrodes P3 and P4.  Strategy represents the activity at think trials compared to no-think trials.  Valence represents the 
activity for negative compared to neutral items.  Laterality represents the activity at FC3 versus FC4 at anterior sites or 
P3 versus P4 at posterior sites. 
a Analyses were not conducted on corresponding anterior windows.  b dfs for all ANOVAs were (1, 34).  
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FIGURE 1: Anterior left-sided (top) and posterior right-sided (bottom) ERP waveforms 
averaged across all conditions and all participants.  ERP components are labeled in blue. 
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FIGURE 2: ERP waveforms for anterior electrodes, FC3 (top) and FC4 (bottom), 
showing four lines representing the activity occurring in each of four experimental 
conditions (i.e., 2 Strategy x 2 Valence). 
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FIGURE 3: ERP waveforms for posterior electrodes, P3 (top) and P4 (bottom), showing 
four lines representing the activity occurring in each of four experimental conditions (i.e, 
2 Strategy x 2 Valence). 
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FIGURE 4: Experimental procedure from the Attention Network Test. The four cue 
conditions are presented in (a). The six stimuli are presented in (b), and the procedure is 
displayed in (c). The double cue condition and neutral stimuli were not included in this 
study.  Adapted from Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, and Posner (2002). 
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FIGURE 6: Examples of neutral (top) and negative images (bottom) like those found in 
the International Affective Picture System (Lange et al., 2008). (Obtained Getty Images 
at http://www.gettyimages.com.)  
136 
 
FIGURE 7: Example neutral female (top) and male (bottom) faces (2 of 80) from Depue 
et al., 2006.  
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FIGURE 8: This is a screenshot of photo-cue (left) and example image-target (right) 
during the learning parts of the training phase. In this case, the photo is male, and the 
target is a negative stimulus. Participants are instructed to memorize these two stimuli as 
a pair. 
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FIGURE 9: This is a screenshot during the recognition test portion of the training phase.  
In this case, the photo-cue (left) is male, and the correct image-target (right) is in the top 
position.  The bottom position has another image as a distractor.  Participants are 
instructed to select the correct image-target by pressing a button corresponding to the top 
or bottom positions. (Target images are copyrighted to Getty Images.) 
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FIGURE 10: This is a screenshot during the experimental phase.  In this case, the photo-
cue is male, and the photo is surrounded by a colored border.  A border indicates that it is 
a no-think condition.  Participants are instructed to attempt actively to prevent the paired 
image from coming into awareness.  When the border is green (think condition), 
participants are instructed to attempt actively to recall the paired image. 
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FIGURE 11: This is a screenshot during the final recall phase.  In this case, the photo-cue 
is male.  When they see a photo-cue as shown above, participants are instructed to 
describe the image-target in 2-5 words. 
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FIGURE 12: Image showing the position of frontal electrodes (FC3 & FC4) and parietal 
electrodes (P3 & P4). 
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FIGURE 13: Posterior P1 component Strategy x Valence interaction (p = .019).  The 
same pattern is seen in a significant 3-way Strategy x Valence x Laterality interaction (p 
= .006) at both the P3 and P4 electrodes, where the effect appears stronger at the P3 
electrode (left side). 
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FIGURE 14: Anterior N2 Strategy x Valence interaction (p = .040), showing that the 
valence of the images produced a reversed pattern of ERP activity on different levels of 
strategy. 
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FIGURE 15: Posterior N2 Strategy x Valence interaction (p = .043), showing that the 
valence of the remembered stimuli produced a greater difference in ERP activity with 
neutral stimuli than negative. 
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FIGURE 16: Late anterior 3-way interaction between Strategy x Valence x Laterality (p 
= .032) depicting the pattern of means in which the effect of valence on strategy is greater 
in the negative condition than the neutral condition and greater again at anterior 
electrodes. 
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FIGURE 17: Late posterior 3-way interaction between Strategy x Valence x Laterality (p 
= .023) depicting the pattern of means in which the effect of valence on strategy is greater 
in the think condition at FC3 and the no-think condition at FC4.
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APPENDIX A:  RESEARCH ASSISTANT SCRIPT & INSTRUCTIONS 
Cognitive Influences on Memory for Faces and Pictures: An EEG/ERP Study 
PART 1 — Script & Run Information 
1. Welcome the participants and give them a copy of the consent form to read. 
2. After they’ve had a chance to read it completely, read the following script (or 
say it in your own words).  
“As you read, this is a two-part study. You are now participating in Part 
1. This part of the study is a short session designed to orient you to the 
task and allow you to fill out several questionnaires before the main study. 
At the end of Part 1, I will schedule an individual time with each of you 
for Part 2. Part 1 is currently taking just under an hour, but Part 2 is 
generally taking a little longer, closer to three hours. The credits work out 
the same, but the time is shifted a little bit. 
“Part 2 will be an EEG study. That is, it involves an electrode cap. As a 
result, be sure to read the preparation instructions in Sona for the day of 
the study. Be sure to get a good night‟s rest the night before (~ 7-8 hours) 
and eat something before coming to the study. Try to avoid a big meal, 
though, as that might make you sleepy. Also, please wash your hair the 
day of the study, but do not use conditioner or makeup, especially bronzer 
or cover-up. 
“Finally, there are three important areas related to research in general 
that I want to be sure you understand. First, research is always voluntary. 
As a result, if you decide to stop participating for any reason, just tell us „I 
want to stop the study,‟ and we‟ll immediately stop collecting data and 
start getting you out of there. If you leave during Part 1, you‟ll only get 
credit for the first part, but if you leave during Part 2, you‟ll get the full 
credit. Of course, this data is important to us, so if you can participate 
until the end, we would appreciate it. Second, the information you give us 
will be kept confidential. We only store your name on one document (the 
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consent form) which will be destroyed when we no longer need to keep it. 
The rest of the data will all be recorded using a number that will be 
assigned to you, and you can expect that anything you tell us will not be 
shared with people outside the lab. Third, there is no harm in 
participating in research. You should leave in the same condition you 
arrived! During this task, there may be some scalp discomfort when we 
are working on the electrodes. Just let us know, and we‟ll leave that spot 
alone. You shouldn‟t feel pain as part of this study. Also, some of the 
images are somewhat disturbing, but they are not worse than images you 
would see on the evening news. 
“Do you have any questions?” 
“Given that information, would you still like to participate? 
3. If they agree to participate, have them sign the consent form and sign after 
them. Offer them a blank consent form if they would like to take one with them 
4. Administer a Part 1 packet to each participant. When each has one, read the 
following statement. 
“Before you is a packet of measures that will ask you about a number of 
different things related to how you act and feel in your day-to-day life. Be 
sure to read the instructions carefully for each measure as they are 
sometimes quite different. If you get stuck on an answer, just choose the 
one that describes you the best, even if it isn‟t very good. However, it is 
very important that you answer all the questions, so please don‟t leave any 
blank. Do you have any questions? (Pause.) Then, please get started. 
When you have finished, please let me know, and we‟ll schedule you for 
Part 2.” 
5. When a participant has completed the packet, quickly review each page to 
ensure that they answered each questions. [VERY IMPORTANT] Pay special 
attention to Item I on the BDI-SF on suicide. If the participant has selected 
anything except choice 0 “I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself,” excuse 
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yourself discretely and try to reach Dr. Faust or Josh Eyer immediately. If you 
cannot, tell the participant that you noticed their answer to that question, 
indicate that you are concerned about them, give them a brochure for the 
Counseling Center, and offer to walk over with him or her to talk to someone 
there. Otherwise, initial the page at the bottom to indicate that you reviewed it.   
6. Offer the participant a choice of open slots, and schedule him or her into the 
slot he or she prefers. If no slots work, take the students’ contact information 
and tell him or her that a researcher will be contacting him or her soon to 
schedule a time for Part 2. Pass that information on to Dr. Faust and Josh Eyer. 
7. Thank them for their participation 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
 
Cognitive Influences on Memory for Faces and Pictures 
 --- An EEG/ERP Study 
PART 2 — Script & Run Information 
 
1. Welcome the participant back and make sure they remember what you’ll be 
doing. 
2. Administer the two-measure packet (RRS and MAAS). Remind the participant 
to read the instructions and answer all the questions. 
3. Ask the participant how much sleep he or she had the night before and how 
long before the study time the participant last ate. Record these values. If the 
participant has not eaten in several hours, offer him or her a short break if he or 
she would like to run get some food from the vending machines on the other 
side of the Colvard Breezeway.  
4.  After the paper measures, seat the participant at the computer in the testing 
room. Allow the participant to become comfortable, then adjust the screen so 
that it is between 53-60 cm from the participant’s face. 
5. Administer the first task, the ANT.  
On the first page of the Instructions for the ANT, point out to the participant 
that the center arrow is in the third position of the five. 
Later, when the task describes the star that appears above and below the center 
cross, say:  
“Be sure to focus on the middle cross, no matter where the star appears. 
You can notice it without moving your eyes. I want you to be sure to keep 
your eyes on the cross despite the distraction of the star appearing above, 
below, or under it.” 
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6.  Next, administer the second task, the SSPAN (spatial/symmetry working 
memory task).  
Say, “This task is a little demanding, so be sure to give it your best effort. 
Let me know if you have any questions.”  Then, stay with the participant 
during the instructions in case he or she has any questions.  
When the task is completed, write the results on the back of the RRS/MAAS 
packet. 
7. After the SSPAN task, ask the participant if he or she needs a restroom. If not, 
begin cap application [Alcohol & exfoliant soap]. Once the eye electrodes and 
nose reference are attached, seat the participant at the computer again, and say 
the following statement.  
“We have a memory task for you to do now. While you are memorizing 
these images, we will be working on the electrodes. We will be putting goo 
into each electrode, like this. (Demonstrate.) Later, we will also be working 
on the connection between the electrodes and your scalp. When we do 
that, we may need to rub some of the electrode sites. Please do your best to 
ignore us and focus on memorizing the pairs. However, if you develop any 
tenderness at any of the sites, please let us know by saying „Ow‟ or „That 
hurts there.‟ We will stop it and move on. Any questions about that?” 
If there are none, then have the participant begin task 3a, the Training Phase. 
8. While the participant is involved in training, fill all electrode cups and then 
check DC values and impedances. Ensure a good connection at F3, F4, P3, and 
P4. Be careful not to obstruct their vision during this process. Once the cap is 
prepared, quietly leave the room and allow the participant to complete the 
training phase. You may turn off NeuroScan recording until the start of the 
next task.  
NOTE: If the lab account has money in it, it is allowable to go get the 
participant a Coke or other beverage at this point. You may ask while putting 
the cap on or during a pause for instructions during the training phase what, if 
anything, the participant desires. 
152 
 
9. When the training phase is complete, begin the Task 3b, the Testing Phase. 
First, start the NeuroScan recording. Then, after allowing the participant to 
read the Instructions for the Testing Phase, ask him or her, “So, what will you 
be doing on this part of the study?”  
This is a quick test for comprehension of the directions. If his or her response 
is not correct, clarify what he or she will be doing on the task. If his or her 
response is satisfactory, continue by showing the participant his or her brain 
activity and reading/saying the following statement. 
“These are your brain waves! You‟ll see that if you stay still, they get very 
calm, and if you blink now, it gets much more active. One way to think of 
this is that if your brain is a party, your muscles are all the music and 
people talking. Your brain waves are like your friend trying to whisper 
next to you. So for this task, we need you to try to keep your movements, 
blinking, tongue movements, tooth grinding, etc., to a minimum. If you 
need to blink, you can wait one or two seconds after you first see an image 
and blink then. Try not to blink during the gap between pictures or when 
you first see an image. I‟ll let you know how you‟re doing with blinks 
during the first break.”  
Then, continue with the following description of the study. 
“This part of the task is the main part of this study. The only way you‟re 
interacting with the computer is through your brain. We‟ll be recording 
your brain activity during this task and trying to tell a difference between 
how your brain acts during the green border trials and the red border 
trials. That means, I need you to focus really hard on the correct image 
when you have a green border, and focus really hard on NOT 
remembering the paired image when you have the red border. Do you 
think you can do that for us?” 
If the participant is ready, allow him or her to start the task. Go to the 
recording room and watch for blinks. They should not occur within a half-
second before the stimulus code or a full second after. If they do, let the 
participant know during the next break. If the blinks are fine, tell him or her 
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that at the break.  
10. There will be four breaks during the task. Each block takes about 10 minutes. 
You can watch the event count on the status window in NeuroScan. There are 
128 events in each block and five blocks. During each break, go into the 
testing room and engage the participant in conversation.  
11. After the Testing Phase is completed, you should stop the Neuroscan 
recording. Take a prepared stimulus response sheet (pages of face 
photographs) on a clipboard into the room. You may remove the participant’s 
chinstrap at this point. Start task 3c, the Final Recall Task, and allow the 
participant to read it before saying the following. 
“If the last task was the most important because we were reading your 
brain waves, this task is very important because it shows us exactly what 
you‟ve learned and what you haven‟t, so I need you to remember the best 
you can. Then, we will know which of these you pairs you managed to 
memorize. We don‟t expect you to remember all of them. The task starts 
quickly, so don‟t start it until you‟re ready. Any questions? (Pause.) You 
may begin when you‟re ready.” 
Do your best to keep up with the subject as he or she responds. If the 
participant appears to become frustrated or discouraged because of forgotten 
pairs, you may say,  
          “That‟s okay. We don‟t expect you to remember all of them. Just do 
your best.” 
If you have trouble keeping up because the participant is saying a lot of words, 
you may say,  
          “Please keep your responses to just a few words.”  
In both cases, it is best to wait until a missed pair to say these. Several 
common abbreviations may be helpful DK or DR mean ―Don’t Know‖ or 
―Don’t Remember‖ and NR means ―No Response.‖  
12. When the Final Recall Phase is complete, give the participant the Debriefing 
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Form and a pen, but do not move the participant yet. When the Debriefing 
form is finished, provide the participant with a towel, shampoo, and privacy, if 
desired.  
13. Thank him or her for participating and give him or her a brief description of 
the study! 
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APPENDIX B:  SELF-REPORT MEASURES 
Contents of Testing Packets for the Pretesting and Main Testing Sessions 
Pretesting (In order administered) 
 Consent  
 Biographical Information Form 
 Edinburgh Handedness Inventory–Revised 
 Beck Depression Inventory–Short Form 
 Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire 
 White Bear Suppression Inventory 
 Perceived Stress Scale 
Primary Testing Session 
 Supplementary Information Form 
 Ruminative Responses Scale 
 Mindful Attention Awareness Scale 
 Debriefing Form 
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